Federal Courts, Article I, and the Problem of "Related to" Bankruptcy Jurisdiction by Pathak, Radha A.
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\85-1\ORE102.txt unknown Seq: 1 30-NOV-06 14:04
RADHA A. PATHAK*
Breaking the “Unbreakable Rule”:
Federal Courts, Article I, and
the Problem of “Related To”
Bankruptcy Jurisdiction
“Related to” bankruptcy jurisdiction endows federal courts with
the power to adjudicate cases that involve only state-law claims,
even when the parties are not of diverse citizenship.  The Su-
preme Court appears to have accepted the validity of “related
to” bankruptcy jurisdiction, but it has never specifically identi-
fied the constitutional basis for such jurisdiction.  Most scholars
agree that Article III authorizes the exercise of federal “related
to” bankruptcy jurisdiction, but they offer competing theories to
support their common conclusion.  The central thesis of this Ar-
ticle is that attempts to find an Article III basis for all “related
to” bankruptcy cases are unavailing.  As such, it is necessary to
reconsider the “unbreakable rule” that the subject matter juris-
diction of Article III courts is strictly limited by Article III itself.
It is necessary to consider whether Congress can utilize its Arti-
cle I powers to enable Article III courts to adjudicate cases that
fall outside the traditional limits of their adjudicative authority.
Federal courts routinely hear lawsuits comprised of entirelystate-law claims, even when the parties are not diverse, be-
cause the lawsuit is held to be “related to” a bankruptcy case.1
According to virtually all federal courts, a lawsuit is “related to”
a bankruptcy if:
[T]he outcome of that proceeding could conceivably have any
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York University School of Law.  I would like to thank Russell D. Covey, Michael
Evans, Patricia Leary, Katherine Lindell, Shaun P. Martin, Hari M. Osofsky, Marcy
Peek, John A.E. Pottow, Peter K. Stris, Stephen J. Ware, Evelyn L. Wilson, and the
staff of the Oregon Law Review  for their assistance.
1 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (2000) endows federal courts with the power to adjudicate
any “civil proceeding” that is “related to” a bankruptcy case.
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effect on the estate being administered in bankruptcy. . . . [For
example, an] action is related to [a] bankruptcy if the outcome
could alter the debtor’s rights, liabilities, options, or freedom
of action (either positively or negatively) and which in any
way impacts upon the handling and administration of the
bankrupt estate.2
This broad grant of jurisdiction encompasses not only suits in
which the debtor is a party,3 but also suits between third parties,
2 Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir. 1984), abrogated in part by
Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 129 (1995) (holding that the
court lacks jurisdiction to review an order remanding a case to state court on the
grounds of procedurally improper removal or lack of subject matter jurisdiction)
(citations omitted).  The Supreme Court has cited but not explicitly adopted the
Pacor test.  Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 308 & n.6 (1995).  Eight circuits
have explicitly adopted the Pacor  test for “related to” bankruptcy jurisdiction.
EOP-Colonnade of Dallas, LP v. Faulkner (In re  Stonebridge Techs., Inc.), 430 F.3d
260, 266 (5th Cir. 2005); New Horizon of N.Y., L.L.C. v. Jacobs, 231 F.3d 143, 151
(4th Cir. 2000); Cont’l Nat’l Bank of Miami v. Sanchez (In re  Toledo), 170 F.3d 1340,
1345 (11th Cir. 1999); In re  G.S.F. Corp., 938 F.2d 1467, 1475 (1st Cir. 1991); Gard-
ner v. United States (In re  Gardner), 913 F.2d 1515, 1518 (10th Cir. 1990); Fietz v.
Great W. Sav. (In re  Fietz), 852 F.2d 455, 457 (9th Cir. 1988); see  Integrated Health
Servs. of Cliff Manor, Inc. v. THCI Co., 417 F.3d 953, 957-58 (8th Cir. 2005); Brown-
ing v. Levy, 283 F.3d 761, 773 (6th Cir. 2002).  The Second Circuit appeared to ini-
tially adopt a different test, see  Turner v. Ermiger (In re  Turner), 724 F.2d 338, 341
(2d Cir. 1983) (focusing on whether the case has a “significant connection” to the
bankruptcy case), but it later clarified that its test for “related to” jurisdiction is
essentially the same as the Pacor  test. See  Publicker Indus., Inc. v. United States (In
re  Cuyahoga Equip. Corp.), 980 F.2d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that “related
to” bankruptcy jurisdiction exists when the “litigation has a significant connection
with a pending bankruptcy proceeding,” and “[t]he test for . . . [this] is whether [the
litigation’s] outcome might have any ‘conceivable effect’ on the bankrupt estate”).
The Seventh Circuit test is “more limited” than the Pacor  test. In re  FedPack Sys.,
Inc., 80 F.3d 207, 213-14 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that “[a] case is ‘related’ to a bank-
ruptcy when the dispute ‘affects the amount of property for distribution [i.e., the
debtor’s estate] or the allocation of property among creditors.’”) (brackets in
original).
3 See, e.g. , Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re  Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & “ERISA”
Litig.), No. MDL 1446, 2003 WL 22472155, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 14, 2003) (holding
that an action by a representative of debtor Enron against former officers, directors,
and employees for state-law tort claims is “related to” Enron’s bankruptcy); Charter
Behavioral Health Sys., L.L.C. v. Managed Health Network, Inc. (In re  Charter Be-
havioral Health Sys., L.L.C.), 277 B.R. 54, 57 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002) (holding that an
action by the debtor to recover money due for services rendered before filing for
relief in bankruptcy and pursuant to the terms of a pre-petition contract does not
“arise under” federal bankruptcy law, but is nonetheless within the court’s subject
matter jurisdiction); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Icahn (In re  Trans World Airlines,
Inc.), 278 B.R. 42, 49-50 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002) (holding that “related to” jurisdiction
exists over an action by the debtor seeking a declaration that third parties had not
tortiously interfered with a pre-petition contract between the debtor and the defen-
dant, and seeking an injunction against the defendant’s commencement of litigation
against the third parties).  “Related to” cases in which the debtor is a party will
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neither of which has sought any federal bankruptcy protection.4
An example illustrates the broad scope of “related to” jurisdic-
tion.  When Enron filed for bankruptcy protection, then-existing
state court lawsuits against Enron were, of course, affected by
the bankruptcy.5  State court lawsuits against parties other than
Enron (e.g., Citigroup for alleged participation in Enron’s fraud),
however, were also removed to federal court, even though these
third parties had not sought bankruptcy protection.6  Because the
third parties might  seek indemnification or contribution from
Enron, the suits against them were held to be “related to” En-
ron’s bankruptcy.7
The United States Supreme Court appears to have accepted
the constitutionality of “related to” bankruptcy jurisdiction, but
it has never explicitly articulated the constitutional basis for such
jurisdiction.8  Scholars have sought to fill this void.  While most
agree that the federal courts’ current exercise of “related to”
bankruptcy jurisdiction is authorized by Article III, they have ad-
vanced competing theories to support their common conclusion.9
involve causes of action that arose before the bankruptcy petition was filed.  1 COL-
LIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 3.01[4][c][ii][A] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds.,
15th ed. rev. 2006) (describing “cases involving causes of action owned by the debtor
when the [bankruptcy petition] was filed” as constituting one category of “related
to” cases).
4 E.g. , Belcufine v. Aloe, 112 F.3d 633, 634 (3d Cir. 1997); Lindsey v. O’Brien,
Tanski, Tanzer and Young Health Care Providers of Conn. (In re  Dow Corning
Corp.), 86 F.3d 482, 494 (6th Cir. 1996); In re G.S.F. , 938 F.2d at 1469; Parrett v.
Bank One, N.A. (In re  Nat’l Century Fin. Enters., Inc., Inv. Litig.), 323 F. Supp. 2d
861, 871 (S.D. Ohio 2004); Beightol v. UBS Painewebber (In re  Global Crossing,
Ltd. Sec. Litig.), 311 B.R. 345, 346-47 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); New York City Employees’
Ret. Sys. v. Ebbers (In re  WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig.), 293 B.R. 308, 311 (S.D.N.Y.
2003).
5 E.g. , Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re  Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & “ERISA”
Litig.), 314 B.R. 354, 355 (S.D. Tex. 2004).
6 Id.
7 Id.  at 357 (holding that an action against parties other than the debtor is within
the federal court’s “related to” bankruptcy jurisdiction).
8 See infra  Part II (discussing Supreme Court cases that appear to accept the con-
stitutionality of “related to” jurisdiction); see also  Ralph Brubaker, On the Nature of
Federal Bankruptcy Jurisdiction:  A General Statutory and Constitutional Theory , 41
WM. & MARY L. REV. 743, 801 (2000) (“The Supreme Court has affirmed unwaver-
ingly the constitutionality of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction over nondiverse state-
law claims; it has not, however, clearly or consistently articulated the basis for this
conclusion.”).
9 See generally John T. Cross, Congressional Power to Extend Federal Jurisdiction
to Disputes Outside Article III:  A Critical Analysis from the Perspective of Bank-
ruptcy , 87 NW. U. L. REV. 1188 (1993) (contending that “related to” jurisdiction falls
within Article III’s bounds because it is a species of ancillary jurisdiction); Thomas
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The central thesis of this Article is that attempts to find an
Article III basis for all “related to” bankruptcy cases are unavail-
ing and, perhaps more importantly, detract attention from a
more fundamental question: under what circumstances, if any,
can Congress utilize its Article I powers to confer power on Arti-
cle III courts to hear cases that fall outside the bounds of Article
III?10  At present, there is a flourishing debate regarding the con-
stitutional legitimacy of Article I tribunals and the extent to
Galligan, Jr., Article III and the “Related To” Bankruptcy Jurisdiction:  A Case Study
in Protective Jurisdiction , 11 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 1 (1987) (contending that
“related to” jurisdiction is a species of protective jurisdiction and that protective
jurisdiction falls within the bounds of Article III and rejecting the position that “re-
lated to” jurisdiction is authorized as a species of supplemental jurisdiction); Carole
E. Goldberg-Ambrose, The Protective Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts , 30 UCLA
L. REV. 542, 553 & n.67 (1983) (arguing that some “related to” cases satisfy the
traditional “arising under” test and that the remainder can be justified by the notion
of protective jurisdiction and that protective jurisdiction falls within the bounds of
Article III); Paul J. Mishkin, The Federal “Question” in the District Courts , 53
COLUM. L. REV. 157, 189-90, 194-95 (1953) (suggesting that federal jurisdiction over
state-law suits brought by trustees is justified by protective jurisdiction); Duane Loft,
Note, Jurisdictional Line-Drawing in a Time When So Much Litigation Is “Related
To” Bankruptcy:  A Practical and Constitutional Solution , 72 FORDHAM L. REV.
1091, 1092 (2004) (concluding that “related to” bankruptcy jurisdiction can be justi-
fied as a species of ancillary jurisdiction as long as one party has filed a proof of
claim in the bankruptcy).
10 A handful of scholars have previously argued that the federal courts’ current
exercise of “related to” bankruptcy jurisdiction sometimes exceeds the grant of juris-
diction embodied in Article III.  These scholars, however, uniformly conclude that
federal courts should therefore modify their definition of “related to” jurisdiction so
as to avoid the unconstitutional exercise of federal jurisdiction.  For example, Pro-
fessor Ralph Brubaker proposes a reimagination of the three categories of jurisdic-
tion contained in § 1334(a) and (b), whereby all claims by and against the estate are
considered claims “arising in” the bankruptcy case and “related to” bankruptcy ju-
risdiction is reserved for third-party disputes that share “a conventional supplemen-
tal relationship with a claim ‘arising under’ the Bankruptcy Code or a claim to which
the bankruptcy estate is party.”  Brubaker, supra  note 8, at 853, 859-69.  Professor R
Brubaker criticizes the Pacor  opinion as being “both unconstitutionally overinclu-
sive and, at the same time, decidedly underinclusive in terms of the intended func-
tion of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction.” Id.  at 753, 869.  Professor Scott Fruehwald
argues that some “related to” cases do not satisfy Article III because the majority’s
interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) is too broad.  E. Scott Fruehwald, The Related
To Subject Matter Jurisdiction of Bankruptcy Courts , 44 DRAKE L. REV. 1, 3 (1995).
He suggests that “bankruptcy court jurisdiction should be limited to proceedings
that involve bankruptcy functions.  These proceedings bind the estate or directly
affect the administration of the estate.” Id.  at 32.  Professor Fruehwald contends
that this limitation on “related to” bankruptcy jurisdiction is required by Article III,
Section 2, id.  at 29-32, and he also suggests that such a limitation is consistent with
protections of due process because a court exercising “related to” bankruptcy juris-
diction has at its disposal nationwide service of process and can assert personal juris-
diction over parties that lack “minimum contacts” with the forum state, id.  at 33-37.
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which Congress should be permitted to create such legislative
courts.  In particular, scholars and courts have recognized that a
literal interpretation of Article III would impose strict limits on
Congress’ authority to create Article I courts, and yet many have
sought to justify past and future departures from such limits.11
Using “related to” bankruptcy jurisdiction as an illustration, this
Article contends that a similar debate is warranted when evaluat-
ing the scope of Article III courts’ jurisdiction.  To what extent, if
at all, should it be permissible to depart from a literal interpreta-
tion of Article III as the exclusive limit on federal jurisdiction?
Part I, Section A outlines the current statutory scheme of fed-
eral bankruptcy law, while Section B provides an overview of
federal bankruptcy jurisdiction.  As explained therein, Congress
has endowed federal courts with original and exclusive jurisdic-
tion over bankruptcy petitions as well as original but not exclu-
sive jurisdiction over causes of action that are dependent upon
the filing of a bankruptcy petition for their existence.12  Congress
has also endowed federal courts with original but not exclusive
jurisdiction over cases that are “related to” a bankruptcy case.13
These “related to” cases would exist even if a bankruptcy peti-
tion had never been filed.  The filing of the bankruptcy petition,
however, makes these cases eligible for review in federal court.14
Part II surveys relevant Supreme Court cases that acknowl-
11 See, e.g. , James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judi-
cial Power of the United States , 118 HARV. L. REV. 643, 646-47 (2004) (“Nearly eve-
ryone agrees that Article III defies literal application. . . . After an ill-fated and
relatively short-lived attempt to establish categorical limits to non-Article III adjudi-
cation in the Northern Pipeline  case, the Court has seemingly retreated to a mul-
tifactored balancing test that includes judicial independence as one factor and often
results in the validation of Article I tribunals.  Scholars have searched, with mixed
success, for an organizing and limiting principle in the somewhat muddled jurispru-
dence that governs the relationship between Article III courts and Article I tribu-
nals.  While some scholars have reacted to the confusion by supporting a return to
principled Article III literalism, others have been unwilling to accept the wholesale
uprooting of the administrative state that such an approach would apparently en-
tail.” (footnotes omitted)).
12 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a)-(b) (2000).
13 Id.  § 1334(b).
14 If a case falls within the scope of Article III, Section 2, it is constitutional for a
federal court to hear the case. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW
OF FEDERAL COURTS § 8, at 32-33 (6th ed. 2002).  There must also exist some con-
gressional authorization (i.e., a statutory basis) for a lower federal court to exercise
subject matter jurisdiction. Id.  A case might be both “related to” a bankruptcy case
and also have some other basis of federal jurisdiction.  This Article is concerned with
cases that use “related to” jurisdiction as the sole basis of federal jurisdiction.
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edge the validity of “related to” jurisdiction but do not identify
the constitutional basis for such jurisdiction.  These cases implic-
itly presume that “related to” bankruptcy jurisdiction is constitu-
tional, but they never ground that assumption in specific Article
III precedent.
Part III addresses the arguments of various scholars who at-
tempt to justify the exercise of “related to” bankruptcy jurisdic-
tion on Article III grounds.  This Part argues that Article III
provides an inadequate constitutional “hook” for “related to” ju-
risdiction.  Part III, Section A explains that “related to” cases do
not all “arise under” federal law.  Some “related to” bankruptcy
cases neither have a “federal ingredient”15 nor rely on or require
reference to federal law.16  As such, those “related to” bank-
ruptcy cases cannot be said to “arise under” federal law.  Section
B maintains that supplemental (pendent or ancillary) jurisdiction
also fails to provide a satisfactory constitutional basis for “related
to” bankruptcy jurisdiction.  Section C rejects the notion of pro-
tective jurisdiction as an Article III basis for “related to” bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction.
Part IV contends that “related to” cases are most accurately
viewed as an exercise of Congress’ Article I power.  As a practi-
cal matter, “related to” bankruptcy cases are heard in federal
court because it is “necessary and proper” to do so in view of the
comprehensive federal bankruptcy scheme.  In light of virtually
universal acceptance by courts of an extremely encompassing
construction of the term “related to,” it appears that most courts
15 In Osborn v. Bank of the United States , 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 823-25 (1824),
the Supreme Court held that Congress could constitutionally grant federal subject-
matter jurisdiction over any case involving the Bank of the United States as a party;
because the Bank’s every action derived from its charter, a federal statute, every
such case would contain at least one “federal ingredient.” Osborn  has been cited
with approval in other Supreme Court cases holding that federal courts may consti-
tutionally exercise subject matter jurisdiction over cases involving federally created
entities.  Am. Nat’l Red Cross v. S.G., 505 U.S. 247, 264 (1992) (stating that “Article
III’s ‘arising under’ jurisdiction is broad enough to authorize Congress to confer
federal-court jurisdiction over actions involving federally chartered corporations”);
Pac. R.R. Removal Cases, 115 U.S. 1, 14 (1885) (holding that subject matter jurisdic-
tion was constitutional because the defendants were federally created corporations),
superseded by statute , Judiciary Act of 1925, ch. 229, § 12, Pub. L. No. 68-415, 43
Stat. 936, 941 (1925).
16 In Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria , 461 U.S. 480, 491-94 (1983), the
Court drew upon Osborn  to conclude that Congress was permitted by Article III to
open the federal courts to a case involving a foreign plaintiff, a foreign defendant,
and state-law claims because the case required the district court to interpret and
apply a federal statute in order to decide whether the lawsuit could move forward.
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view the exercise of federal jurisdiction in these cases as constitu-
tionally appropriate.  At the same time, however, Supreme Court
precedent appears to preclude reliance on Article I as a basis for
federal subject-matter jurisdiction over those “related to” bank-
ruptcy cases that do not fall within the bounds of Article III.
Perhaps for this reason, the focus of most scholars has been to
develop theories about Article III to justify this exercise of juris-
diction with insufficient regard for the text and structure of Arti-
cle III itself.  Only by acknowledging the insufficiency of an
Article III basis for “related to” bankruptcy jurisdiction can
there be an open and meaningful debate regarding whether, and
under what circumstances, Congress may utilize its Article I pow-
ers to allow Article III courts to adjudicate cases that do not fit
within their traditional, limited subject matter jurisdiction.
I
AN OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY
LAW AND JURISDICTION
Federal bankruptcy law provides a formal organizing structure
for creditors to collectively satisfy debts owed to them and for
debtors to seek relief from an often-debilitating debt burden.17
Debtors agree to put their available assets in the hands of the
legal system, in the hope that they (the debtors) can put their
financial difficulties behind them.18  Creditors’ mandatory partic-
ipation19 is premised on the expectation that they will recover
more than they would have if they had engaged in self-help,
which carries a higher risk of failure than a cooperative, collec-
tive process to recover debt.20
17 CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 1 (1997) (“The goals of a
bankruptcy case are twofold:  resolving the competing claims of multiple creditors,
and  freeing the debtor from its financial past.”).
18 In liquidation cases, debtors literally put their assets in the hands of the legal
system in the hopes that they will receive a discharge. Id. at 2.  In reorganization
cases, debtors remain in possession of their assets, but the legal system nonetheless
maintains some level of control over the debtors.
19 Once a bankruptcy petition has been filed, the mandatory stay prohibits credi-
tors from attempting to collect from the debtor.  11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2000); see also
infra note 39.  As a result, the creditor must participate in a bankruptcy in order to
have any hope of recovery.
20 Id. at 4-5 (describing the difficulty involved with individual recourse under state
collection law).
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\85-1\ORE102.txt unknown Seq: 8 30-NOV-06 14:04
66 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85, 59
A. The Federal Bankruptcy Statutory Scheme
Title 11 of the United States Code, referred to as the Bank-
ruptcy Code, contains the body of substantive law governing the
federal bankruptcy regime.21  An individual or entity that wishes
to seek the protection afforded by federal bankruptcy law must
file a bankruptcy petition under Chapter 7, Chapter 9, Chapter
11, Chapter 12, or Chapter 13 of Title 11.22  Creditors may also
21 DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, THE ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 4 (3d ed. 2001) (“Since
1978 the Bankruptcy Code has been embodied in Title 11 of the United States
Code.”); TABB, supra  note 17, at 51 (“The substantive law of bankruptcy is found in R
title 11 of the United States Code, commonly referred to as the ‘Bankruptcy
Code.’”).  The Bankruptcy Code, in referring to Title 11, does not capitalize the
word “title.”  This Article will capitalize the word “Title” unless directly quoting
from the Bankruptcy Code or another source that does not capitalize the word.
22 11 U.S.C. §§ 109 (describing the requirements to file under various chapters),
301(a) (stating that an individual bankruptcy case is commenced upon the filing of
the petition under the appropriate chapter), 302 (2000) (stating the same for joint
cases); 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra  note 3, ¶ 1.03[1] & n.1; TABB, supra  note
17, at 52.  Chapters 1, 3, and 5 of Title 11 apply to all types of bankruptcy cases. R
BAIRD, supra  note 21, at 5; DAVID G. EPSTEIN, BANKRUPTCY AND RELATED LAW IN R
A NUTSHELL 124 (7th ed. 2005); TABB, supra  note 17, at 52.  Chapters 7, 9, 11, 12, R
and 13 each pertain to different kinds of bankruptcy cases. TABB, supra  note 17, at R
52; see BAIRD, supra  note 21, at 15.  Chapters 7, 11, and 13 are the commonly known R
chapters:  Chapter 7 offers liquidation for both individuals and commercial entities,
Chapter 11 offers reorganization for commercial entities (though individuals can
take advantage of it as well), and Chapter 13 offers rehabilitation for individuals.
BAIRD, supra  note 21, at 15-17; 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra  note 3, ¶¶
1.03[2][a], 1.03[4], 1.03[6].  Chapter 9 pertains to municipalities. BAIRD, supra  note
21, at 15; 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra  note 3, ¶ 1.03[3].  Chapter 12 provides
relief for family farmers.  1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra  note 3, ¶ 1.03[5].  The
sections within Chapters 7, 9, 11, 12, and 13 apply only to the chapter within which
the section is found. TABB, supra  note 17, at 52; see BAIRD, supra  note 21, at 5. The R
Bankruptcy Amendments of 2005 added Chapter 15, which is intended to “incorpo-
rate the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency so as to provide effective mecha-
nisms for dealing with cases of cross-border insolvency.”  11 U.S.C. § 1501(a); see
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.
109-8, § 801, 119 Stat. 23, 134-46 (2005); see generally  1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY,
supra  note 3, ¶ 1.03[7] (describing Chapter 15).  Chapter 15 permits a “foreign rep-
resentative” to commence a Chapter 15 case by filing a “petition for recognition.”
11 U.S.C. §§ 1504, 1515.  The petition for recognition permits the foreign representa-
tive to seek the assistance of U.S. courts to facilitate a foreign bankruptcy. See id.
§ 1521 (listing the relief available to a foreign representative that files a petition for
recognition); Michael P. Richman & Craig E. Reimer, Bankruptcy Update:  Con-
gress Overhauls the Nation’s Bankruptcy Laws—Impact on Commercial Cases , 59
CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 388, 396-97 (2005).  Chapter 15 is similar to former sec-
tion 304 of the Bankruptcy Code, which was repealed by the Bankruptcy Amend-
ments of 2005, and dealt with cases ancillary to foreign proceedings.  Richman &
Reimer, supra , at 397.
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take advantage of federal bankruptcy law by filing an involuntary
petition.23
The petition may seek liquidation or rehabilitation (reorgani-
zation), depending on the chapter under which the debtor pro-
ceeds.24  Chapter 7 provides for liquidation and Chapters 9, 11,
12, and 13 offer rehabilitation of one kind or another, rather than
liquidation.25  In a liquidation case, the court will appoint a bank-
ruptcy trustee to act as the representative of the estate.26  The
trustee will gather all of the debtor’s assets, evaluate all of the
claims submitted by the various creditors, sell the assets, and dis-
tribute the income to the creditors.27  The debtor generally is dis-
charged from the obligations he or she incurred before filing for
bankruptcy protection.28  In a reorganization case, a trustee may
or may not be appointed.  In a Chapter 11 case, it is rare to ap-
point a trustee.29  Instead, the “debtor in possession” serves as
the representative of the estate.30  A reorganization case pro-
ceeds differently than a liquidation case because the objective is
to preserve the debtor (commonly a business) as a going concern.
23 11 U.S.C. § 303; TABB, supra  note 17, at 68, 74. R
24 EPSTEIN, supra  note 22, at 124 (“There are two general forms of bankruptcy R
relief:  (1) liquidation and (2) rehabilitation or reorganization.  The Bankruptcy
Code provides for these two forms of relief in five separate kinds of bankruptcy
cases:  (1) Chapter 7 cases, (2) Chapter 9 cases, (3) Chapter 11 cases, (4) Chapter 12
cases, and (5) Chapter 13 cases.”).
25 Chapter 7 is entitled “Liquidation” and Chapter 11 is entitled “Reorganiza-
tion.” See also EPSTEIN, supra  note 22, at 124-26 (discussing the basic differences R
between Chapter 7 and Chapters 11 and 13); TABB, supra  note 17, at 52 (explaining R
that Chapters 9, 11, 12, and 13 “provide for some form of rehabilitation of the
debtor, as opposed to a straight liquidation”).
26 11 U.S.C. § 323; see BAIRD, supra  note 21, at 10.  (“The principal officer in a R
Chapter 7 case is the bankruptcy trustee.”).
27 TABB, supra  note 17, at 63, 69-71; see  11 U.S.C. § 704 (describing the duties of a R
trustee); BAIRD, supra  note 21, at 10; EPSTEIN, supra  note 22, at 124-26.  Professor R
Baird points out that “[m]any individuals filing Chapter 7 have no assets.  The issue
to litigate in these cases is the scope of bankruptcy’s fresh start policy, not the divi-
sion of spoils among the creditors.” BAIRD, supra  note 21, at 16. R
28 11 U.S.C. § 727; BAIRD, supra  note 21, at 15-16 (“An individual who is hope- R
lessly in debt can file a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, give up all nonexempt assets,
and walk away from nearly all pre[-]bankruptcy obligations.”); EPSTEIN, supra  note
22, at 124-25.  A corporation cannot be discharged from its pre-bankruptcy obliga- R
tions. See  11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1) (a debtor that is not an individual may not be dis-
charged); BAIRD, supra  note 21, at 16. R
29 EPSTEIN, supra  note 22, at 131; TABB, supra  note 17, at 63, 74. R
30 11 U.S.C. § 1101 (defining “debtor in possession”); BAIRD, supra  note 21, at 10; R
TABB, supra  note 17, at 63, 74-76; see also  11 U.S.C. §§ 1104 (describing the condi- R
tions under which a trustee is appointed in a Chapter 11 case), 1107 (describing the
“[r]ights, powers, and duties of debtor in possession”).
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\85-1\ORE102.txt unknown Seq: 10 30-NOV-06 14:04
68 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85, 59
Nonetheless, the assets of the debtor must be collected.  Rather
than selling the assets to satisfy the debts owed to creditors, how-
ever, a reorganization case requires a plan to be created for re-
payment over time.31
Regardless of whether a bankruptcy petition seeks liquidation
or rehabilitation, the Bankruptcy Code provides the trustee or
debtor in possession with various tools to collect the full assets of
the estate.32  Furthermore, the Bankruptcy Code creates a pro-
cess for determining which debts are valid and hence must be
satisfied.33  The Bankruptcy Code also provides the order by
which the debts will be satisfied,34 and it provides that entities
that assist the bankruptcy process will be compensated for their
work.35
In both a voluntary and involuntary case, the filing of the peti-
tion commences the bankruptcy case.36  “Commencement” of the
case “creates an estate,”37 which, “[w]ith only minor exceptions,
. . . includes all property of the debtor as of the time of the filing
of the bankruptcy petition.”38  Filing the petition in a voluntary
case also immediately imposes an automatic stay upon any ef-
forts to collect debts from the debtor.39  Finally, the filing of the
voluntary petition itself operates as an order for relief.40
B. Federal Bankruptcy Jurisdiction
Bankruptcy cases are heard in federal court.  The federal bank-
31 BAIRD, supra  note 21, at 16 (“Chapter 13 allows an individual to keep all assets, R
but in return the debtor must create a plan under which creditors receive as much
out of the debtor’s future income as they would have received had the debtor filed
under Chapter 7.”); EPSTEIN, supra  note 22, at 126; TABB, supra  note 17, at 73 (“The R
ultimate goal of chapter 11 is to confirm a plan for working out the debtor’s financial
obligations.”).
32 E.g. , 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b) (avoidance of fraudulent conveyances, as defined by
state law), 547 (avoidance of preferential transfers), 548 (avoidance of fraudulent
conveyances, as defined by § 548 itself).
33 See, e.g. , id. §§ 501, 502.
34 See, e.g. , id. §§ 507, 725, 726.
35 See, e.g. , id. §§ 327, 330, 503, 1103.
36 Id. §§ 301(a), 303(b) (voluntary and involuntary case respectively).
37 Id. § 541(a); TABB, supra  note 17, at 69. R
38 EPSTEIN, supra  note 22, at 167; see also  11 U.S.C. § 541 (describing “[p]roperty R
of the estate”).
39 11 U.S.C. § 362(a); BAIRD, supra  note 21, at 11 (“[The automatic stay] requires R
creditors to cease all debt collection efforts the moment a petition is filed.”); TABB,
supra  note 17, at 146 (“[The stay] arises automatically upon the filing of a bank- R
ruptcy petition.”).
40 11 U.S.C. § 301(b); TABB, supra  note 17, at 68. R
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ruptcy jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1334, confers subject mat-
ter jurisdiction on the federal district courts and the federal
district courts “refer” bankruptcy cases to the bankruptcy
courts.41  Bankruptcy courts, which are Article I rather than Arti-
cle III courts, serve as adjuncts to the district courts.42  Much has
been written about the proper allocation of responsibility be-
tween the bankruptcy courts and the federal district courts, but
this Article is primarily concerned with the proper scope of the
district court’s subject matter jurisdiction, so it is unnecessary to
focus on the reference process or the division of power between
the bankruptcy courts and district courts.
The bankruptcy statute authorizes the federal courts to hear
four types of cases: “cases under title 11,” “civil proceedings aris-
ing under title 11,” “civil proceedings . . . arising in . . . cases
under title 11,” and “civil proceedings . . . related to cases under
title 11.”43  These four categories can be understood as follows:
First, federal district courts have original and exclusive juris-
diction over “all cases under title 11.”44  Title 11 is the section of
the United States Code that contains all substantive federal
bankruptcy law.45  A “case[ ] under title 11” is comprised of the
bankruptcy petition itself.46  The federal district court in which
41 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) (“Each district court may provide that any or all cases under
title 11 and any or all proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a
case under title 11 shall be referred to the bankruptcy judges for the district.”);
BAIRD, supra  note 21, at 25; Lawrence P. King, Jurisdiction and Procedure Under the R
Bankruptcy Amendments of 1984 , 38 VAND. L. REV. 675, 678 (1985) (“Each district
court may refer all, some, or no cases and proceedings or parts thereof to the bank-
ruptcy judges of the district.  The authority to refer cases and proceedings under
section 157(a) has been exercised by local rule or order in all federal judicial dis-
tricts.  Accordingly, bankruptcy judges continue to handle most, if not all, bank-
ruptcy cases.”).
42 King, supra  note 41, at 677 (“[B]ankruptcy courts were and are nonarticle III R
courts.”); see BAIRD, supra  note 21, at 23; cf.  N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon R
Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 60-61 (1982) (describing attributes of bankruptcy judges
under the 1978 Act; these attributes were retained in the 1984  Bankruptcy Act and
still apply today).
43 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a)-(b).
44 Id. § 1334(a).
45 TABB, supra  note 17, at 51. R
46 In re  Marcus Hook Dev. Park, Inc., 943 F.2d 261, 264 (3d Cir. 1991) (“[C]ases
under Title 11, ‘refer[] merely to the bankruptcy petition itself.’”); Wood v. Wood
(In re  Wood), 825 F.2d 90, 92 (5th Cir. 1987); 9 AM. JUR. 2D Bankruptcy  § 560
(1999) (“‘A case under Title 11’ means the original bankruptcy petition itself from
which all other bankruptcy proceedings spring.  In other words, a ‘case’ is the bank-
ruptcy case per se upon which all of the postpetition proceedings are predicated.”
(footnotes omitted)); 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra  note 3, ¶ 3.01[3]. R
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the bankruptcy petition is pending also has “exclusive jurisdic-
tion of all of the property, wherever located, of the debtor as of
the commencement of [the title 11] case, and of property of the
estate.”47  Finally, the federal district court in which the petition
is pending has exclusive jurisdiction “over all claims or causes of
action that involve construction” of the statutory section that
pertains to the retention of professionals by the trustee and to
“rules relating to disclosure requirements under” that section.48
Second, federal district courts have original and nonexclusive
jurisdiction over “all civil proceedings arising under title 11.
. . .”49  A civil proceeding “arising under” Title 11 asserts a cause
of action created by Title 11.50  For example, the Bankruptcy
Code permits the bankruptcy trustee to void a transfer of the
debtor’s property if the transfer was made “to or for the benefit
of a creditor,” as payment for “an antecedent debt,” “while the
debtor was insolvent,” within a specified period of time before
the filing of the bankruptcy petition, and if the transfer permits
the creditor to receive more than his or her fair share (i.e., more
than he or she would have received if the debt were recorded and
paid as part of the administration of the bankruptcy case).51  The
Bankruptcy Code also provides that the trustee can avoid con-
veyances that are either actually fraudulent52 or constructively
fraudulent.53  Further, the Bankruptcy Code incorporates state
fraudulent conveyance law and allows the trustee to avoid a
transfer that state law would permit a creditor to avoid.54  Where
47 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e)(1); 9 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 46, § 570.
48 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e)(2).  The section that pertains to retention of professionals is
11 U.S.C. § 327.
49 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b).
50 Wood , 825 F.2d at 96 (citing 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 3.01 (1987)); 9 AM.
JUR. 2D, supra note 46, § 563; 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra  note 3, ¶ R
3.01[4][c][i].
51 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (setting out the circumstances under which a trustee can
void a preferential transfer).
52 Id. § 548(a)(1)(A) (stating that a transfer may be avoided if it was both made
within a specified period of time preceding the filing of the bankruptcy petition and
if it was made “with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any entity to which the
debtor was or became, on or after the date that such transfer was made or such
obligation occurred, indebted”); EPSTEIN, supra  note 22, at 223 (distinguishing be- R
tween an actually fraudulent transfer and a constructively fraudulent transfer).
53 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B); EPSTEIN, supra  note 22, at 223 (“Establishing a con- R
structively fraudulent conveyance turns on the adequacy of consideration for the
transfer and the financial position of the debtor, rather than the intention of the
debtor.”).
54 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1); see also  King, supra  note 41, at 693 (“If there is any R
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a trustee has not been appointed, a debtor in possession may pur-
sue nearly all of the causes of action created by the Bankruptcy
Code.55  The “arising under” category of federal bankruptcy ju-
risdiction is quite similar to the archetypal example of federal
question jurisdiction: a federal statute creates a cause of action
and, thus, federal courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate that
cause of action.
In addition to their jurisdiction over “civil proceedings arising
under title 11,” federal district courts also have original and
nonexclusive jurisdiction over “civil proceedings . . . arising in . . .
cases under title 11.”56  A civil proceeding “arising in” a case
under Title 11 is one “that [is] not based on any right expressly
created by title 11, but nevertheless, would have no existence
outside of the bankruptcy.”57  A simple example is the allowance
or disallowance of claims filed by creditors against the debtor.58
“‘Arising in’ acts as the residual category of civil proceedings.”59
Finally, federal courts have original jurisdiction over proceed-
ings that are “related to” the bankruptcy case.  It is widely recog-
nized that “related to” jurisdiction “is the most extensive in our
history, and indeed, was designed to be as broad as the Constitu-
tion permits.”60  The Third Circuit has articulated the most com-
monly cited test of whether a proceeding is “related to” a
bankruptcy case.  A lawsuit is “related to” a bankruptcy when:
[T]he outcome of that proceeding could conceivably have any
effect on the estate being administered in bankruptcy. . . .  An
action is related to bankruptcy if the outcome could alter the
debtor’s rights, liabilities, options, or freedom of action (either
positively or negatively) and which in any way impacts upon
the handling and administration of the bankrupt estate.61
This broad grant of jurisdiction includes actions that the debtor
creditor who can, under state law, contest a prebankruptcy transfer as fraudulent,
the trustee may assert that right and bring the action.”).
55 11 U.S.C. § 1107 (describing the “[r]ights, powers, and duties of debtor in
possession”).
56 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b).
57 Wood v. Wood (In re  Wood), 825 F.2d 90, 97 (5th Cir. 1987); 9 AM. JUR. 2D,
supra note 46, § 564; 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra  note 3, ¶ 3.01[4][c][iv]. R
58 EPSTEIN, supra  note 22, at 461. R
59 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra  note 3, ¶ 3.01[4][c][iv]. R
60 Brubaker, supra  note 8, at 748. R
61 Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir. 1984), abrogated in part by
Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 129 (1995) (citations omitted).
Most circuits have adopted the language of the Pacor  test. See supra note 2. R
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could have commenced in the absence of the bankruptcy case.62
Any cause of action that could have been asserted by the debtor
when he or she was not yet a debtor will become property of the
estate upon the filing of the bankruptcy petition63 and the lawsuit
that asserts such a cause of action will be “related to” the bank-
ruptcy case.64
“Related to” jurisdiction also encompasses actions between
third parties.  For example, when news of the Enron corporate
scandal reached the public, plaintiffs initiated state court lawsuits
against parties such as Citibank, Salomon Smith Barney, and J.P.
Morgan that alleged that these parties had participated in En-
ron’s fraud.65  When Enron filed for bankruptcy protection, the
suits against the third parties were removed to federal court on
the ground that they were “related to” Enron’s bankruptcy
case.66 The court reasoned that these defendants might seek in-
demnification or contribution from Enron and thus that the out-
come of these lawsuits might conceivably have an effect on the
62 See, e.g. , Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 308 n.5 (1995) (recognizing
that the case in Northern Pipeline  would be considered a “related to” case); N. Pipe-
line Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 56 (1982) (action by debtor
Northern Pipeline against defendant for breach of contract, breach of warranty, mis-
representation, coercion, and duress); Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re  Enron Corp.
Sec., Derivative & “ERISA” Litig.) (Enron I), No. MDL 1446, 2003 WL 22472155
at *2 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 14, 2003) (action by representative of debtor for state-law tort
claims against former officers, directors, and employees of debtor); Charter Behav-
ioral Health Sys., L.L.C. v. Managed Health Network, Inc. (In re  Charter Behav-
ioral Health Sys., L.L.C.), 277 B.R. 54, 57 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002) (action by the
debtor to recover money due for services rendered before filing for bankruptcy re-
lief); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Icahn (In re  Trans World Airlines, Inc.), 278 B.R.
42, 49-50 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002) (action by the debtor that sought a declaration that
third parties had not tortiously interfered with a pre-petition contract between the
debtor and the defendant and an injunction against the defendant’s commencement
of litigation against third parties); 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra  note 3, ¶ R
3.01[4][c][ii][A] (describing “cases involving causes of action owned by the debtor
when the [bankruptcy petition] was filed” as constituting one category of “related
to” cases).
63 11 U.S.C. § 541(a); 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra  note 3, ¶ 3.01[4][c][ii] R
(explaining that “related to” cases include cases asserting “causes of action owned
by the debtor that become property of a title 11 estate under section 541”).
64 Enron I , 2003 WL 22472155, at *2; Trans World Airlines,  278 B.R. at 49-50; cf.
Charter , 277 B.R. at 57 (holding that an action by the debtor to recover money due
for services rendered before filing for relief in bankruptcy and pursuant to the terms
of a pre-petition contract is within the subject matter jurisdiction conferred by 28
U.S.C. § 1334).
65 Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re  Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & “ERISA” Litig.),
314 B.R. 354, 354 (S.D. Tex. 2004).
66 Id.  at 357.
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bankruptcy estate.67  Similarly, when WorldCom filed for bank-
ruptcy, cases against parties other than WorldCom were held to
be “related to” WorldCom’s bankruptcy case.68  Global Cross-
ing’s bankruptcy similarly precipitated removal of state-law
claims against parties other than the debtor.69
Removal of state-law actions against nondebtors is not limited
to the recent spate of corporate scandals.  Mass torts also create a
situation in which one corporation’s bankruptcy is used to re-
move a myriad of tort suits to federal court.  When Dow Corning
was sued by thousands of plaintiffs injured by silicon gel breast
implants, it filed for bankruptcy and sought a federal forum for
all suits pending against it.70  However, manufacturers other than
Dow Corning also removed cases pending against them.71  The
court confirmed that these suits were properly the subject of fed-
eral “related to” bankruptcy jurisdiction because the nondebtors
might seek contribution or indemnification from Dow Corning.72
In light of the Chapter 11 filings of the Archdiocese of Portland,
the Diocese of Tucson, and the Diocese of Spokane,73 one could
67 Id.  (holding that an action against parties other than the debtor is within the
federal court’s “related to” jurisdiction).
68 New York City Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. Ebbers (In re  WorldCom, Inc. Sec.
Litig.), 293 B.R. 308, 322-23 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (suit against former officers, directors,
underwriters, and accountants was “related to” WorldCom’s bankruptcy case). But
see  Ret. Sys. of Ala. v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 285 B.R. 519, 529 (M.D. Ala. 2002)
(rejecting the argument that a lawsuit against underwriters was “related to”
WorldCom’s bankruptcy case merely because the parties might pursue indemnifica-
tion or contribution claims against WorldCom in the future).
69 Breightol v. UBS Painewebber (In re  Global Crossing, Ltd. Sec. Litig.), 311
B.R. 345, 347 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
70 Lindsey v. O’Brien, Tanski, Tanzer and Young Health Care Providers of Conn.
(In re  Dow Corning Corp.), 86 F.3d 482, 485-86 (6th Cir. 1996).
71 Id.  at 486-87.
72 Id.  at 493-94 (“The potential for Dow Corning’s being held liable to the
nondebtors in claims for contribution and indemnification, or vice versa, suffices to
establish a conceivable impact on the estate in bankruptcy.  Claims for indemnifica-
tion and contribution, whether asserted against or by Dow Corning, obviously would
affect the size of the estate and the length of time the bankruptcy proceedings will
be pending, as well as Dow Corning’s ability to resolve its liabilities and proceed
with reorganization.”).
73 Allison Walsh Smith, Chapter 11 Bankruptcy:  A New Battleground in the Ongo-
ing Conflict Between Catholic Dioceses and Sex-Abuse Claimants , 84 N.C. L. REV.
282, 283-85 (2005); Catholic Diocese Gets Out of Bankruptcy , KANSAS CITY STAR
(Mo.), Sept. 21, 2005, at A6 (reporting that the Diocese of Tucson had “emerged
from bankruptcy,” but that the Archdiocese of Portland and the Diocese of Spokane
“remained mired in litigation”). See generally  Open letter from John G. Vlazny,
Archbishop of Portland, Archdiocese of Portland in Or. (July 6, 2004), available at
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imagine similar examples occurring in state court litigation in-
volving the Catholic Church.
Even though federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction
over all “related to” cases, the courts may abstain from hearing
certain kinds of “related to” bankruptcy cases.  Federal courts
must  abstain from hearing “related to” bankruptcy cases that sat-
isfy the following conditions: (1) there has been a timely motion
for the court to abstain, (2) the case derives its federal subject
matter jurisdiction only from the fact that it is related to a bank-
ruptcy case, (3) the case “is commenced,”74 and (4) the case “can
be timely adjudicated” in state court.75  Federal courts also retain
the discretion to abstain “in the interest of justice, or in the inter-
est of comity with State courts or respect for State law” from a
case that “arises under,” “arises in,” or “relates to” a bankruptcy
case.76
Whether or not these abstention provisions are invoked, they
do not deprive the federal district court of subject matter juris-
diction over the “related to” bankruptcy case.77  Moreover, the
conditions that trigger a “mandatory” duty to abstain are suffi-
http://www.archdpdx.org/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-letter.html (last visited Aug. 14,
2006) (explaining the basis for the Portland Archdiocese bankruptcy filing).
74 Courts disagree about whether this condition requires the presence of an ongo-
ing state court action.  New York City Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. Ebbers (In re
WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig.), 293 B.R. 308, 331 n.36 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (discussing the
potential ambiguity in the statute).
75 28 U.S.C.S. § 1334(c)(2) (LexisNexis 2003 & Supp. 2006) (“Upon timely motion
of a party in a proceeding based upon a State law claim or State law cause of action,
related to a case under title 11 but not arising under title 11 or arising in a case under
title 11, with respect to which an action could not have been commenced in a court
of the United States absent jurisdiction under this section, the district court shall
abstain from hearing such proceeding if an action is commenced, and can be timely
adjudicated, in a State forum of appropriate jurisdiction.”).
76 Id. § 1334(c)(1) (“Except with respect to a case under chapter 15 of title 11,
nothing in this section prevents a district court in the interest of justice, or in the
interest of comity with State courts or respect for State law, from abstaining from
hearing a particular proceeding arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case
under title 11.”); see also Ebbers , 293 B.R. at 332, 334 (articulating the factors used
by courts in the Second Circuit to decide whether discretionary abstention is appro-
priate and recognizing that equitable remand is governed by the same principles as
discretionary abstention); Ret. Sys. of Ala. v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 285 B.R.
519, 530-31 (M.D. Ala. 2002) (describing factors that should inform the discretionary
abstention decision); cf.  28 U.S.C. § 1452(b) (2000) (allowing remand on any equita-
ble ground).
77 Cf.  King, supra  note 41, at 700-01 (“[M]andatory abstention does not involve a R
jurisdictional issue.”).  Of course, such a fact may not be particularly important as a
matter of bankruptcy practice.  It is, however, significant for the purpose of constitu-
tional analysis.
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ciently subjective as to make the decision largely discretionary.78
Further, the mandatory abstention provision does not apply to
personal injury tort or wrongful death claims against the
debtor.79
II
ACCEPTANCE OF “RELATED TO” JURISDICTION
BY THE SUPREME COURT
Scholarly literature recognizes that although the Supreme
Court has acknowledged the validity of “related to” bankruptcy
jurisdiction, it has never explained the constitutional basis for
such jurisdiction.80  Implicit in several (but not all) relevant Su-
preme Court decisions is the presumption that there is an Article
III basis for “related to” bankruptcy jurisdiction.
This Part will describe relevant bankruptcy cases decided by
the United States Supreme Court, each of which strongly sup-
ports the conclusion that the Court believes “related to” jurisdic-
tion is constitutional.  Only some of these cases actually involve a
“related to” bankruptcy lawsuit.  None of these cases squarely
present the issue of whether “related to” bankruptcy jurisdiction
falls within the bounds of Article III.  Nonetheless, the Court has
dropped hints, some subtle and some not-so-subtle, that it be-
lieves “related to” jurisdiction fits safely within constitutional
bounds.
In Lathrop v. Drake ,81 the Court stated that a federal court
may hear any case in which an assignee in bankruptcy is a party
and the suit “touch[es] any property, or rights of property” of the
78 Cf. id.  at 700 (“The requirements [of mandatory absention] are of such a na-
ture, however, as to limit considerably the occasions for use of subsection (c)(2).
Rarely will they all be present.”).
79 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra  note 3, ¶ 3.06[2]; King, supra  note 41, at R
693-95 (explaining that personal injury actions against the estate must be heard in a
federal district court and cannot be heard in a state court); see  28 U.S.C.
§§ 157(b)(2)(B) (core proceedings do not include “the liquidation or estimation of
contingent or unliquidated personal injury tort or wrongful death claims against the
estate”), 157(b)(4) (“Non-core proceedings under section 157(b)(2)(B) of title 28,
United States Code, shall not be subject to the mandatory abstention provisions of
section 1334(c)(2).”).
80 Galligan, supra  note 9, at 20 (“In a series of cases the United States Supreme R
Court has recognized Congress’ power to grant the federal courts broad jurisdiction
over cases related to bankruptcy.  Unfortunately, these decisions fail to posit a per-
suasive analytical justification for the jurisdiction.”).
81 Lathrop v. Drake, 91 U.S. 516 (1875).
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debtor.82  The modern equivalent of an assignee in bankruptcy is
the bankruptcy trustee.83  Interestingly, the Court in Lathrop  ap-
peared to rely on Article I, rather than Article III, to justify its
conclusion.  Its discussion is not extensive enough to conclude
that the Court intended Article I to be the sole basis of federal
jurisdiction over a suit involving an assignee, but the decision
leaves no doubt that the Court believed some  constitutional basis
existed for the exercise of federal jurisdiction.
In Lathrop , the creditors of a debtor had obtained a judgment
against the debtor and sold his property at a sheriff’s sale to sat-
isfy the judgment.84  Less than four months after the adverse
judgment was obtained, the debtor filed for bankruptcy in fed-
eral court in the Western District of Pennsylvania.85  As a result,
the debtor’s assignee in bankruptcy (Lathrop) sued the creditors
to recover the value of the debtor’s property.86  Lathrop sued the
creditors in the circuit court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania.87
The Supreme Court upheld the exercise of jurisdiction by the
federal court in the Eastern District.  The Supreme Court was
concerned primarily with whether a suit by the assignee to re-
cover the debtor’s assets could be brought in a circuit court in a
82 Id.  at 519-20.  The quoted language comes from the language of the Bankruptcy
Act of 1867, which conferred upon the circuit courts jurisdiction to hear suits
“‘brought by the assignee in bankruptcy against any person claiming an adverse in-
terest, or by such person against such assignee, touching any property, or rights of
property, of said bankrupt, transferable to or vested in such assignee.’” Id.  at 518.
There is an argument that the Court believed the federal courts would have jurisdic-
tion over any  suit where the assignee was a party, regardless of whether the suit was
connected to any property of the debtor. See id.  at 520 (suggesting that no meaning-
ful limit on jurisdiction is imposed by the words, “touching any property, or rights of
property, of said bankrupt”).  Because the instant suit was certainly about the prop-
erty of the debtor, the Court did not have to consider whether the “property” lan-
guage imposed any significant restriction on federal jurisdiction. Id.  (“In this case,
however, the suit does concern and have reference to property transferable to the
assignee.”).
83 The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 replaced assignees in bankruptcy with bankruptcy
trustees.  Bardes v. Hawarden Bank, 178 U.S. 524, 526 (1900).
84 The summary of facts of this case is available online at Westlaw.  Lathrop v.
Drake, 14 F. Cas. 1178 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1873) (opinion of lower court).
85 Id.  It is not clear whether the debtor filed for bankruptcy in the district court
or in the circuit court of the Western District.
86 Id.
87 Id.  At the time, federal circuit courts had both original and appellate jurisdic-
tion. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 29 (5th ed. 2003); WRIGHT & KANE, supra  note
14, §1, at 5.
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\85-1\ORE102.txt unknown Seq: 19 30-NOV-06 14:04
2006] Breaking the “Unbreakable Rule” 77
district other than the one in which the bankruptcy petition was
filed.88  The Court concluded that federal courts other than the
one where the bankruptcy proceedings were pending did have
jurisdiction over suits such as Lathrop’s.89  Lathrop’s cause of ac-
tion was created by the bankruptcy statute,90 so it is not surpris-
ing that the Court was not troubled by the exercise of federal
subject-matter jurisdiction in this particular case.
The Court did not confine itself, however, to the relatively sim-
ple question of whether a federal court can adjudicate an as-
signee’s suit that asserts a cause of action created by federal
bankruptcy law.  Instead, the Court stated more broadly that a
federal court can adjudicate any  suit “brought by or against the
assignee in reference to alleged property of the bankrupt, or to
claims alleged to be due from him or to him.”91  The Court did
not distinguish between suits that alleged causes of action created
by federal law and suits that alleged only causes of action created
by state law.  The Court explained that suits initiated by the as-
signee to recover assets owed to the bankruptcy estate were nec-
essary to aid the bankruptcy.92  The Court seemed to draw upon
Congress’ Article I powers to justify federal jurisdiction.  After
noting that state courts could certainly provide a forum for such
suits, the Court stated that “a uniform system of bankruptcy, na-
tional in its character, ought to be capable of execution in the
national tribunals, without dependence of the States in which it is
possible that embarrassments might arise.”93  Article I, Section 8,
Clause 4 confers upon Congress the authority “[t]o establish . . .
uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the
88 Lathrop v. Drake, 91 U.S. 516, 516 (1876) (“The question in this case is,
whether, under the Bankrupt Act as passed in 1867, an assignee in bankruptcy, with-
out regard to the citizenship of the parties, could maintain a suit for the recovery of
assets in a circuit court of the United States in any district other than that in which
the decree of bankruptcy was made . . . .”).
89 Id.  at 518-19 (concluding that the district court would have jurisdiction over the
suit and that the circuit court has the same jurisdiction as the district court would
have).
90 Id. at 520 (“[This case] is brought to compel the defendants to restore to the
bankrupt’s estate the value of property sold by them under a judgment alleged to
have been confessed in fraud of the Bankrupt Act, and within four months of the
commencement of proceedings in bankruptcy.”).
91 Id.  at 517.
92 Id.  at 518 (“Proceedings ancillary to and in aid of the proceedings in bank-
ruptcy may be necessary in other districts where the principal court cannot exercise
jurisdiction; and it may be necessary for the assignee to institute suits in other dis-
tricts for the recovery of assets of the bankrupt.”).
93 Id.  at 518.
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United States.”94  The Court’s mention of a “uniform system of
bankruptcy” is a clear reference to Article I.  The Court did not
state that the suits involving trustees as parties were suits “arising
under . . . the Laws of the United States.”  Indeed, the Court did
not mention Article III at all.  While Lathrop  does not necessa-
rily support the conclusion that the Court believed suits involving
assignees were constitutional under Article I, it certainly does
support the conclusion that the Court believed that some consti-
tutional basis existed for federal adjudication of such suits.
In Bardes v. Hawarden Bank ,95 the Supreme Court decided
against the exercise of federal jurisdiction, but its conclusion
rested on statutory grounds.  The opinion demonstrates that the
Court believed that a federal court can constitutionally exercise
jurisdiction over any suit by a trustee to recover assets of the
bankruptcy estate, regardless of whether the suit, if it had been
brought by the debtor before filing for bankruptcy, could have
been brought in a federal court.
In Bardes , the trustee (Bardes) of the bankruptcy estate sued
the First National Bank of Hawarden, Iowa to recover the value
of goods transferred by the debtor to the bank within four
months of the filing of the bankruptcy petition.96  Bardes sued in
federal court in Iowa.97  The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 provided
that “[s]uits by the trustee shall only be brought or prosecuted in
the courts where the bankrupt, whose estate is being adminis-
tered by such trustee, might have brought or prosecuted them if
proceedings in bankruptcy had not been instituted, unless by
consent of the proposed defendant.”98  The Court found that the
suit could not have been filed by the debtor in district court be-
cause district courts at the time did not have “jurisdiction of suits
at law or in equity between private parties,”99 and there was no
suggestion that the defendant consented to be sued in district
court.  As a result, the district court lacked jurisdiction.100
The most important aspect of the Court’s analysis is that the
94 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (“[The Congress shall have Power to] establish an
uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies
throughout the United States[.]”).
95 Bardes v. Hawarden Bank, 178 U.S. 524 (1900).
96 Id. at 525.
97 Id.
98 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 23(b), 30 Stat. 544, 552 (1898); Bardes , 178
U.S. at 529 (quoting statute).
99 Bardes , 178 U.S. at 537.
100 Id.  at 537-39.
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Court was entirely unconcerned about whether the hypothetical
suit by the debtor would have enjoyed diversity jurisdiction or
would have arisen under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States.  The Court cared only that the defendant failed to
consent because the absence of consent meant that there was no
statutory authorization for the district court to exercise jurisdic-
tion.  The Court was clear that, if the defendant were to consent,
a federal district court could  entertain jurisdiction over suits that,
if brought before bankruptcy proceedings had been initiated,
could not have been asserted in federal court.101
In Schumacher v. Beeler , the Court confronted an argument
regarding the statutory scope of the federal court’s subject matter
jurisdiction.102  In resolving the statutory question, the Court
again expressed its view that Congress could constitutionally
grant federal subject-matter jurisdiction over any case initiated
by a bankruptcy trustee against an adverse party, regardless of
the lack of diversity and the allegation of only state-law claims.103
Ralph K. Beeler was the bankruptcy trustee for the debtor,
Long & Allstatter Company.104  Some time before filing for
bankruptcy, Long & Allstatter had lost a suit in Ohio state court
and the sheriff had executed on the judgment by levying the
debtor’s property.105  The execution occurred more than four
months before the debtor filed for bankruptcy, but the property
had not been sold by the time of the filing.106  Consequently,
Beeler initiated suit against the sheriff to enjoin the sale of the
property.  The suit alleged causes of action created by state law,
not federal bankruptcy law.107
The sheriff contended that the court lacked subject matter ju-
risdiction over the case.108  The relevant jurisdictional statute—
section 23(b) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 as it existed in
1934—provided that a federal court would have jurisdiction over
non-bankruptcy proceedings between a bankruptcy trustee and
an adverse claimant, but only with the consent of the adverse
101 See id.
102 Schumacher v. Beeler, 293 U.S. 367 (1934).
103 See id.  at 374.
104 See id. at 367.  Some of these facts are available only online in the Westlaw
summary of the case.
105 See id.  at 368-69.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 369.
108 Id.  at 369-70.
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\85-1\ORE102.txt unknown Seq: 22 30-NOV-06 14:04
80 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85, 59
claimant.109  In other words, Congress provided that in an action
between a trustee and another party, where there was no diver-
sity of citizenship, and the action contained only causes of action
created by state law, the federal court could nonetheless exercise
subject matter jurisdiction as long as the other party con-
sented.110  The sheriff’s position was that he had not consented,
but the Court rejected that contention and held that the federal
court had jurisdiction over the suit.111
The Court made clear that federal courts could permissibly ex-
ercise jurisdiction over suits such as this one.112  In a brief discus-
sion, the Court explained that, while Congress’ intent in section
23 was to leave most suits between trustees and adverse parties
to the state courts, there was “no reason” why a federal court
could not hear such a case if the adverse party consented.113  As
it is a well-settled principle that parties cannot overcome a con-
stitutional deficiency in subject matter jurisdiction by consent,114
the Court’s opinion must be read to indicate that there is nothing
in the Constitution that bars federal jurisdiction over a state-law
action between a trustee and a third party.  Moreover, as support
for that proposition, the Court stated: “The Congress, by virtue
of its constitutional authority over bankruptcies [under Article I,
Section 8], could confer or withhold jurisdiction to entertain such
suits and could prescribe the conditions upon which the federal
courts should have jurisdiction.”115
In Williams v. Austrian , the Court again upheld the exercise of
109 11 U.S.C. § 46(a) (1926); Schumacher , 293 U.S. at 368 n.1 (quoting statute).
110 The statute excepted from this consent requirement suits that were “brought
by the trustee in bankruptcy to recover property transferred by the bankrupt in ef-
fecting preferences made voidable by the Act, and suits to recover property con-
veyed by the bankrupt in fraud of creditors within four months prior to the filing of
the petition in bankruptcy.” Schumacher , 293 U.S. at 376.
111 Id.  at 370-71 (“The sheriff contends that he had no authority to give the con-
sent; but he was the defendant in the suit and his consent was actually given.  We
find no ground for concluding that the consent was invalid.”).
112 Id. at 371 (stating that it is “correct” that “Congress had power to permit suits
by trustees in bankruptcy in the federal courts against adverse claimants, regardless
of diversity of citizenship”).
113 Id. at 374.
114 Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 126 S. Ct. 1235, 1244 (2006); Commodity Futures
Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986); United States v. Griffin, 303
U.S. 226, 229 (1938); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 5.1, at 261-62
(4th ed. 2003); WRIGHT & KANE, supra  note 14, at 28 (“The rule is that the parties R
cannot confer on a federal court jurisdiction that has not been vested in the court by
the Constitution and Congress.”).
115 Schumacher , 293 U.S. at 374.
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federal jurisdiction over a suit brought by a bankruptcy trustee
that alleged only state-law causes of action, even though there
was no diversity of citizenship.116  In Williams , the trustees of the
debtor, Central States Electric Corporation, sued the debtor’s
current and former officers and directors.  The suit alleged that
the defendants had misappropriated corporate assets through
fraud and mismanagement.117  The causes of action were created
by state law, and the federal court did not have diversity jurisdic-
tion over the suit.118  The Court was largely concerned with
whether the federal statute conferred jurisdiction, and Justice
Frankfurter, joined by Justice Jackson, penned a long dissent on
that issue.119  The fight between the majority and the dissent is
illuminating because neither group doubted Congress’ power to
grant federal jurisdiction over such a suit.120  Their disagreement
was entirely about whether Congress chose in the particular stat-
ute before them to confer federal jurisdiction.121
In Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line
Co ., a “related to” case, the Court confronted a deeply signifi-
cant issue of jurisdiction, yet it never questioned the constitution-
ality of “related to” jurisdiction.122  Even though the Court in
Marathon  was concerned with a question other than whether
“related to” jurisdiction falls within the scope of Article III, it is
difficult to read the Marathon  opinion without concluding that
all of the justices believed that “related to” jurisdiction does  fall
within the bounds of Article III.
In Marathon,  Northern Pipeline Construction Company filed a
petition for reorganization and subsequently filed a suit in bank-
116 Williams v. Austrian, 331 U.S. 642, 657-58, 662 (1947).
117 Id. at 645 (majority opinion); id. at 664 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
118 Id.  at 645 (majority opinion) (noting that there was no diversity jurisdiction
and that the case rested solely on jurisdiction conferred by the bankruptcy statutes);
id.  at 664 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“[N]either diversity of citizenship nor other
ground of federal jurisdiction exists [over the trustee’s suit].”).
119 Id.  at 662-82 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
120 Id.  at 664 (expressing “[n]o doubt [that] Congress could authorize” federal
jurisdiction over a suit brought by a bankruptcy trustee where there is no diversity of
citizenship or other basis of federal jurisdiction).
121 Compare id.  at 657-58 (majority opinion) (“Congress intended . . . to establish
the jurisdiction of federal courts to hear plenary suits brought by a reorganization
trustee, even though diversity or other usual ground for federal jurisdiction is lack-
ing.”), with id.  at 664 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“[There is no] doubt that Con-
gress has not conferred upon the district courts the power to entertain . . . a suit by
an ordinary bankruptcy trustee [where diversity of citizenship is lacking and no
other ground of federal jurisdiction exists].”).
122 N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
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ruptcy court against Marathon Pipe Line Company that alleged
only state-law causes of action.123  Federal bankruptcy law at the
time provided that such a suit could be filed in federal bank-
ruptcy court.124  Federal bankruptcy judges were not, and are still
not, Article III judges.125  Marathon argued that Northern’s suit
could not constitutionally be heard by a non-Article III judge.126
There was no majority opinion, but a majority of the Court
agreed that bankruptcy judges could not hear “related to” cases.
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Ste-
vens, concluded that bankruptcy did not fall within the same cat-
egory as any of the previously recognized situations in which the
Court had concluded that Congress was empowered by Article I,
and not prohibited by Article III, to create legislative courts.127
Justices Rehnquist and O’Connor did not join Justice Brennan’s
opinion, but they agreed that there was no authority for a non-
Article III judge to adjudicate Northern’s state-law cause of ac-
tion against Marathon.128
However, all nine justices appeared to believe that it would be
proper for a federal court to exercise jurisdiction over Northern’s
action.  In a footnote in his plurality opinion, Justice Brennan
stated that the debtor’s breach of contract claim against Mara-
thon was properly heard in federal court because of its “relation-
ship to the petition for reorganization.”129  He did not explain
123 Id. at 56 (“Northern . . . filed a petition for reorganization in January 1980.  In
March 1980[,] Northern, pursuant to the Act, filed in [bankruptcy court] a suit
against . . . Marathon Pipe Line Co. . . . [Northern] sought damages for alleged
breaches of contract and warranty, as well as for alleged misrepresentation, coercion
and duress.”).  There was presumably no trustee in this reorganization case.
124 See id.  at 54 (“The bankruptcy courts can hear claims based on state law as
well as those based on federal law.”).  The Bankruptcy Act of 1978 was the first
recognition of a civil proceeding “related to” a case under Title 11. Id.  (describing
the 1978 Act’s elimination of the distinction between summary and plenary jurisdic-
tion in favor of the categories that exist today).  The 1978 Act conferred upon the
bankruptcy courts the power to hear “related to” cases. Id. at 54 & n.3 (noting that
“the ultimate repository of the Act’s broad jurisdictional grant is the bankruptcy
courts”); see  28 U.S.C. § 1471(b) (1982).
125 See Marathon , 458 U.S. at 60-61 (“It is undisputed that the bankruptcy judges
whose offices were created by the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 do not enjoy the protec-
tions constitutionally afforded to Art. III judges.”).
126 Id. at 56-57 (“Marathon sought dismissal of the suit, on the ground that the
Act unconstitutionally conferred Art. III judicial power upon judges who lacked life
tenure and protection against salary diminution.”).
127 Id.  at 76 (plurality opinion).
128 Id. at 91 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
129 Id.  at 72 n.26 (plurality opinion).
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the basis for this conclusion, but his citations indicate that he
would have lodged “related to” jurisdiction within the “arising
under” clause of Article III.130  Justice Rehnquist concurred in
the judgment and recognized that Northern’s suit was in bank-
ruptcy court only because Northern had filed a bankruptcy peti-
tion.  Justice Rehnquist was not troubled by the idea of an
Article III court adjudicating the action; he indicated only that
he agreed that a non-Article III court could not hear the case.131
Chief Justice Burger, in his dissent, stated that Congress would
be free to comply with the Court’s holding by providing that ac-
tions such as Northern’s would be heard in federal district court,
rather than bankruptcy court.132  Justice White in his dissent also
explicitly stated that actions such as Northern’s suit against Mar-
athon could be heard in Article III courts.133
In Celotex Corp. v. Edwards , the Supreme Court approved the
exercise of federal jurisdiction over a proceeding that did not in-
volve a trustee or a debtor.134  Bennie and Joann Edwards had
filed a tort suit against Celotex in the Northern District of
Texas.135  The Edwardses prevailed, Celotex posted a superse-
deas bond, and Northbrook Property and Casualty Insurance
Company served as the surety on the bond.136  When the Fifth
Circuit affirmed the judgment, Celotex filed for bankruptcy pro-
tection in the Middle District of Florida.137
Five days after Celotex filed its bankruptcy petition, the Flor-
ida bankruptcy court issued an injunction to prohibit the Ed-
wardses from proceeding against Northbrook (Celotex’s surety)
to enforce the bond.138  In response, the Edwardses filed a mo-
tion in the district court where they had sued Celotex (Northern
District of Texas) to obtain permission to execute on the bond.139
130 See id. (citing Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448,
472 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Tidewater, 337 U.S. 582,
611-13 (1949) (Rutledge, J., concurring); Williams v. Austrian, 331 U.S. 642 (1947);
Schumacher v. Beeler, 293 U.S. 367 (1934); Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 738 (1824)).
131 Id.  at 90-91 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
132 Id.  at 92 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
133 Id.  at 95 (White, J., dissenting).
134 See  Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 309 (1995).
135 Id.  at 302.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id.  at 303.
139 Id.
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The Texas district court granted the motion,140 and the Fifth Cir-
cuit affirmed.141  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review
the Fifth Circuit’s decision to allow the Edwardses to enforce the
bond against Northbrook.142
The Edwardses urged the Supreme Court to affirm the Fifth
Circuit on the ground that the Florida bankruptcy court had
lacked jurisdiction to enjoin them from suing Northbrook to exe-
cute on the bond.143  The Supreme Court concluded that the
bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to issue such an injunction be-
cause the Edwardses’ suit against Northbrook was “related to”
Celotex’s bankruptcy.144  The Court did not have to confront
whether such “related to” jurisdiction was constitutional.  It ac-
knowledged, however, “that a bankruptcy court’s ‘related to’ ju-
risdiction cannot be limitless.”145  The fact that the Court
expressed no uncertainty about the propriety of the case before it
strongly suggests that the Court would not seriously entertain a
constitutional challenge to the exercise of “related to” jurisdic-
tion in a suit between parties that have not sought bankruptcy
protection and that involves causes of action created entirely by
state law.
III
THE LACK OF AN ARTICLE III BASIS FOR
“RELATED TO” JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court has not explicitly stated that the Constitu-
tion supports the exercise of “related to” bankruptcy jurisdiction,
but scholars have attempted to fill the conceptual gaps left by the
Court’s jurisprudence.  In identifying the constitutional basis of
“related to” bankruptcy jurisdiction, scholars have primarily re-
lied upon Article III, which separately enumerates nine bases of
federal subject-matter jurisdiction and includes a tenth basis as
well.146  Two of those bases offer possible shelter for “related to”
140 Id.  at 303-04.
141 Id.  at 305-06.
142 Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 511 U.S. 1105, 1105 (1994) (granting in part the
petition for writ of certiorari).
143 Celotex , 514 U.S. at 307.
144 Id.  at 309 (“We believe that the issue whether respondents are entitled to im-
mediate execution on the bond against Northbrook is at least a question ‘related to’
Celotex’s bankruptcy.”).
145 Id. at 308.
146 “The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall
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bankruptcy jurisdiction.  The first is federal question jurisdiction,
a federal court’s jurisdiction over claims or causes of action147
that “arise under [the U.S.] Constitution, the Laws of the United
States, [or] Treaties.”148  The second is supplemental jurisdiction
(or pendent or ancillary jurisdiction), a federal court’s jurisdic-
be made, under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—to
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;—to Controversies be-
tween two or more States;—between a State and Citizens of another State;—be-
tween Citizens of different States;—between Citizens of the same State claiming
Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof,
and foreign states, Citizens or Subjects.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1, amended by
U.S. CONST. amend. XI.  The provision specifically enumerates nine bases of federal
jurisdiction, which are commonly divided into two categories:  “jurisdiction based
primarily on subject matter,” which includes the first three enumerated bases; and
“jurisdiction based on party status,” which includes the remaining six bases. FAL-
LON ET AL., supra  note 87, at 13.  The tenth basis of federal jurisdiction is supple-
mental jurisdiction, which is authorized by the words “cases” and “controversies” in
Article III, Section 2. See UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966) (explaining that
Article III, Section 2 permits jurisdiction over an entire “case,” which can include
one claim that falls within one of the nine enumerated categories and another that
does not).
147 Article III does not refer to “causes of action” or “claims,” but rather to
“cases” and “controversies.”  Because this Article focuses on the text of Article III
and urges that the text should be taken literally in determining whether “related to”
bankruptcy jurisdiction falls within the language of Article III, perhaps it is inappro-
priate to speak of jurisdiction over claims or causes of action because the relevant
constitutional provisions do not do so.  However, the current understanding by the
courts and scholars of federal subject-matter jurisdiction appears to rely on a claim-
by-claim analysis of subject matter jurisdiction. E.g. , John B. Oakley, Federal Juris-
diction and the Problem of the Litigative Unit:  When Does What “Arise Under” Fed-
eral Law? , 76 TEX. L. REV. 1829, 1832 (1998); John B. Oakley, Integrating
Supplemental Jurisdiction and Diversity Jurisdiction:  A Progress Report on the Work
of the American Law Institute , 74 IND. L.J. 25, 26 (1998).  If it did not, there would
appear to be no purpose for supplemental jurisdiction.  Supplemental jurisdiction
recognizes that some causes of action in a lawsuit could not be heard in federal court
if they were alone, but their presence in a lawsuit with other causes of action that
could be heard in federal court if asserted alone might  be enough to allow the “defi-
cient” claims to be heard in federal court as well.  However, the doctrine of supple-
mental jurisdiction requires a particular relationship between the deficient and
sufficient claims.  It is not the case that any lawsuit asserting both sufficient and
deficient claims will enjoy federal subject-matter jurisdiction; only in those lawsuits
in which the sufficient and deficient claims bear a particular relationship to one an-
other will the federal courts be empowered to adjudicate the entire suit. Cf. Gibbs ,
383 U.S. at 725; FALLON ET AL., supra  note 87, at 924 n.2 (discussing Professor
Oakley’s argument that subject matter jurisdiction “attaches to” claims rather than
to entire actions).
148 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.  Article III provides that federal courts have
subject matter jurisdiction over “all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority.” Id.
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tion to adjudicate not only claims or causes of action that fall
within the scope of Article III, Section 2, but rather an entire
“case” or “controversy,” which might include some claims that
do not fall within the bounds of Article III and thus could not be
heard by a federal court if they were not accompanied by at least
one claim that does fall within the bounds of Article III, Section
2.149  Scholars have also attempted to utilize the theory of “pro-
tective jurisdiction” to justify “related to” bankruptcy jurisdiction
as an exercise of Article III judicial power.
This Part will explore the flaws in these three primary argu-
ments to ground “related to” bankruptcy jurisdiction in Article
III.  It will first consider the difficulties involved with justifying
“related to” bankruptcy jurisdiction as an exercise of “arising
under” jurisdiction.  It will next analyze the problems with view-
ing “related to” jurisdiction as a species of “supplemental” juris-
diction.  Finally, it will engage the limitations of the theory of
“protective jurisdiction” as a justification grounded in Article III.
A. “Arising Under” Jurisdiction
Perhaps the most common basis for Article III jurisdiction is
what is known as federal question jurisdiction.150  Federal ques-
tion jurisdiction exists when the claim in question “arises under”
federal law.151  A claim will “arise under” federal law within the
meaning of Article III, Section 2 as long as the claim contains a
“federal ingredient.”152  Of particular relevance in determining
whether “related to” bankruptcy jurisdiction arises under federal
law, a claim contains a federal ingredient for one of the following
two reasons: (i) the claim may involve a federal entity or (ii) the
claim may require the interpretation or application of federal
law.  Although many cases that are “related to” a bankruptcy do
involve one or both of these elements, this Part demonstrates
149 See Gibbs , 383 U.S. at 725.
150 CHEMERINSKY, supra  note 114, § 5.2.1, at 265 (“The core of modern federal R
court jurisdiction is cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United
States.  Termed federal question jurisdiction , these cases comprise the largest compo-
nent of the federal courts’ docket and are widely viewed as the most important com-
ponent of the federal courts’ workload.”).
151 See supra note 148. R
152 Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 823 (1824) (“We think,
then, that when a question to which the judicial power of the Union is extended by
the constitution, forms an ingredient of the original cause, it is in the power of
[C]ongress to give the [C]ircuit [C]ourts jurisdiction of that cause . . . .”); CHEMERIN-
SKY, supra  note 114, § 5.2.2, at 271-72. R
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that there are undoubtedly some cases that are “related to” a
bankruptcy that do not involve a federal entity and do not re-
quire application or interpretation of federal law.  These cases,
therefore, cannot be said to “arise under” federal law.
1. The Federal Entity Argument
The Supreme Court has repeatedly declared that a case may
“arise under” federal law if a party to the case is an entity created
by federal law.153  “Related to” bankruptcy cases may involve a
federally created entity and may “arise under” federal law for
this reason.  However, even if some “related to” cases do involve
a federally created entity and the presence of such an entity is
considered sufficient to cause them to “arise under” federal law
within the meaning of Article III, there are some “related to”
cases in which no federally created entity is present, and thus, the
federal entity argument fails to bring all “related to” cases within
the purview of Article III’s “arising under” language.  This Sec-
tion will first briefly describe the federal entity line of cases.  It
will next analyze whether such precedent might sweep some “re-
lated to” cases within the “arising under” language of Article III.
It will then conclude that the federal entity argument, even if
accepted, cannot identify an Article III basis for all “related to”
cases.
In the seminal case of Osborn v. Bank of the United States154
and its companion case, Bank of the United States v. Planters’
Bank of Georgia ,155 the United States Supreme Court intro-
duced the principle that a case may “arise under” federal law if a
party to the case is an entity created by federal law.  In Osborn ,
the Bank of the United States (Bank) sued Ralph Osborn, Audi-
tor of the State of Ohio, in federal court to enjoin the collection
of state taxes from the Bank on the grounds that the taxes were
unconstitutional.156  The tax was forcibly collected from the
Bank, so the Bank amended its complaint to name additional
state officials as defendants and to demand that the money be
returned to the Bank.157  In Planters’ Bank , the Bank of the
153 See, e.g. , Am. Nat’l Red Cross v. S.G., 505 U.S. 247, 251 (1992); Pac. R.R.
Removal Cases, 115 U.S. 1, 11 (1885), superseded by statute , Judiciary Act of 1925,
ch. 229, § 12, Pub. L. No. 68-415, 43 Stat. 936, 941 (1925).
154 Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
155 Bank of the U.S. v. Planters’ Bank of Ga., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904 (1824).
156 Osborn , 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 739-40.
157 Id.  at 741-42.
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\85-1\ORE102.txt unknown Seq: 30 30-NOV-06 14:04
88 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85, 59
United States sued Planters’ Bank in federal court, but alleged
only breach of contract under state law.158  In Osborn , the Court
explained why federal jurisdiction in both cases was constitu-
tional.  The Court noted that the Bank’s every action derived
from its charter of incorporation, the federal statute that created
it and gave it “every faculty which it possesses.”159  As a result,
“[t]o use the language of the constitution, every act of the Bank
arises out of [the federal charter of incorporation.]”160 Osborn
has been used to confer federal jurisdiction on cases involving
federally chartered corporations, even when (i) the parties are
not diverse, (ii) no federally created cause of action is at issue,
and (iii) no other enumerated basis for federal subject-matter ju-
risdiction exists.
In the Pacific Railroad Removal Cases ,161 the Supreme Court
considered whether removal was proper in seven cases against
two federally incorporated railroads.162  The sole basis for re-
moval to federal court in each case was the fact that a federally
chartered corporation was a party to the suit.163  The Supreme
Court’s opinion was largely concerned with the statutory basis
for removal, but the Court made clear that the exercise of juris-
diction was constitutional under the “arising under” clause of Ar-
ticle III because the defendants were entities created by a federal
statute.164  Though the Court’s holding as to the statutory basis of
jurisdiction has been superseded by statute,165 it is still good law
158 See Planters’ Bank , 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 904-05.
159 Osborn , 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 823.
160 Id. at 827.
161 Pac. R.R. Removal Cases, 115 U.S. 1 (1885), superseded by statute , Judiciary
Act of 1925, ch. 229, § 12, Pub. L. No. 68-415, 43 Stat. 936, 941 (1925) (current ver-
sion at 28 U.S.C. § 1349 (2000)) (“The district courts shall not have jurisdiction of
any civil action by or against any corporation upon the ground that it was incorpo-
rated by or under an Act of Congress, unless the United States is the owner of more
than one-half of its capital stock.”).
162 Id.  at 3.
163 Id.  at 3-10 (describing the seven cases).
164 Id.  at 14 (“If the case of Osborn v. The Bank of the United States , is to be
adhered to as a sound exposition of the constitution, there is no escape from the
conclusion that these suits against the plaintiffs in error, considering the said plain-
tiffs as corporations created by and organized under the acts of Congress referred to
in the several petitions for removal in these cases, were and are suits arising under
the laws of the United States.”).
165 Judiciary Act of 1925, ch. 229, § 12, Pub. L. No. 68-415, 43 Stat. 936, 941 (1925)
(current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1349 (2000)); see also  Am. Nat’l Red Cross v. S.G.,
505 U.S. 247, 251 (1992) (recognizing that Congress had passed a statute restricting
the holding in the Pacific Railroad Removal Cases  that the general federal question
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that any case involving a federally created entity falls within the
bounds of Article III.
In American National Red Cross v. S.G. , the Court reaffirmed
the principle that cases involving federally created entities “arise
under” federal law.166  In that case, the plaintiffs sued the Red
Cross, a federally chartered corporation, in state court for state-
law tort claims and alleged that the Red Cross was the source of
HIV-contaminated blood supplied to one of the plaintiffs.167  The
Court permitted the Red Cross to remove the case, explaining
that the exercise of federal jurisdiction would be “well within Ar-
ticle III’s limits” because it was a “longstanding and settled rule”
that “Article III’s ‘arising under’ jurisdiction is broad enough to
authorize Congress to confer federal-court jurisdiction over ac-
tions involving federally chartered corporations.”168  Again, most
of the opinion was devoted to an analysis of whether federal ju-
risdiction was statutorily authorized, but the Court’s constitu-
tional discussion is significant.
This “federal entity” line of cases suggests that at least one cat-
egory of “related to” bankruptcy cases does “arise under” federal
law: those “related to” bankruptcy cases where the bankruptcy
trustee is a party. The Bankruptcy Code provides for the exis-
tence of a bankruptcy trustee and endows that trustee with cer-
tain rights and obligations.  The Bankruptcy Code designates the
trustee as a representative of the estate and gives the trustee the
capacity to sue or be sued.169  As a result, scholars have argued
that, where the bankruptcy trustee is a party in a “related to”
case, the trustee represents the requisite “federal ingredient” and
the case “arises under” federal law.170
The validity of this argument depends, however, on the reach
of the Court’s holding in Osborn .  In Osborn , the Court ex-
plained that the Bank’s capacity to sue and be sued depended on
statute conferred federal jurisdiction over any case involving a federally created
chartered corporation).
166 Red Cross , 505 U.S. at 264-65.
167 Id.  at 249.
168 Id. at 264-65.
169 11 U.S.C. § 323 (2000).
170 Cross, supra  note 9, at 1232; Goldberg-Ambrose, supra  note 9, at 553 (“In R
bankruptcy litigation, federal law establishes a new class of plaintiffs able to assert a
claim that originates completely under state law.  In the absence of this federal law,
the new class of persons could not have brought the same claims in state court.”
(footnote omitted)).
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the Bank’s federal charter,171 but that this question, “decided
once, is decided for ever.”172  The Court noted that other ques-
tions, such as the Bank’s “right to make a particular contract, or
to acquire a particular property, or to sue on account of a partic-
ular injury, belongs to every particular case, and may be renewed
in every case.”173  It is unclear whether the Court intended to
communicate that the question of capacity to sue would form an
“original ingredient” in every case, regardless of whether it was
raised.  The Court was clear that questions such as the right to
make a contract, even if not challenged by any party, would
nonetheless be a “part of” the case, such that they would form an
“ingredient,” regardless of whether the opposing side chose to
assert a defense based on them.174  But it is not clear that the
Court believed that the existence of just one question—the
Bank’s capacity to sue or be sued—would be enough to cause
any case involving the Bank to “arise under” federal law.  The
Court did  declare that Congress’ grant of jurisdiction occurred
before the first court confirmed the Bank’s capacity to sue or be
sued and stated that “if [the grant of subject matter jurisdiction]
was constitutional then, it cannot cease to be so, because the par-
ticular question is decided.”175  The Court also pointed out that
the question of the Bank’s capacity to sue or be sued could “be
revived at the will of the party, and most probably would be re-
newed, were the tribunal to be changed.”176  Nonetheless, the
Court did not have to grapple with a situation in which the only
question that requires reference to federal law is the entity’s ca-
pacity to sue or be sued.
“Related to” bankruptcy cases present just such a situation.
The role of the trustee in a “related to” case is different than the
171 Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 823-24 (1824) (“When a
Bank sues, the first question which presents itself, and which lies at the foundation
of the cause is, has this legal entity a right to sue?  Has it a right to come, not into
this Court particularly, but into any Court?  This depends on a law of the United
States.”).
172 Id.  at 824 (“The right to sue, if decided once, is decided for ever . . . .”).
173 Id.
174 Id.  (“The question [of the right to make a particular contract, or acquire a
particular property, or to sue on account of a particular injury] forms an original
ingredient in every cause.  Whether it be in fact relied on or not, in the defence, it is
still part of the cause, and may be relied on. . . . The questions which the case in-
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role of the Bank, the national railroads, or the American Red
Cross in any of the cases in which those entities were parties.
Even though the bankruptcy trustee can be said to derive all of
its faculties from a federal statute, a “related to” case does not
involve any questions, even hypothetically, about the trustee’s
faculties.  A “related to” case where the trustee is a party will
pertain to conduct of the debtor.  For example, the suit might
involve money or property that the debtor is owed on account of
the behavior of the debtor or someone or something with which
the debtor was involved.  A “related to” case will not involve any
contract that the trustee entered into or wrongful conduct that
the trustee committed.  Such a lawsuit would “arise under” or
“arise in” the bankruptcy case because such a lawsuit would nec-
essarily involve federal bankruptcy law, which governs the trus-
tee’s duties.  A “related to” case involves only one question
about the trustee: does the trustee have the capacity to sue or be
sued as a representative of the debtor?  That question is an-
swered by reference to federal law, but, arguably, that question,
“decided once, is decided for ever.”177  All other questions in the
lawsuit will pertain to the debtor, not the trustee, and these ques-
tions do not necessarily require reference to federal bankruptcy
law.  As a result, the existence of a trustee in a “related to” case
may be insufficient to cause the case to “arise under” federal law.
Even if the federal entity argument is persuasive with respect
to “related to” cases involving the trustee, however, it is inappli-
cable to “related to” cases in which the trustee is not a party.  It
is rare to appoint a trustee in a Chapter 11 case.178  Instead, the
debtor performs the functions that a trustee would ordinarily
perform.179  In such instances, the debtor is referred to as the
“debtor in possession.”180
The “federal entity” line of cases might suggest that the debtor
in possession represents a “federal ingredient” in the same man-
177 Id.
178 EPSTEIN, supra  note 22, at 131; TABB, supra  note 17, at 63, 74.  Indeed, a spe- R
cial showing is required before a trustee will be appointed in a Chapter 11 case.  11
U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2000); see also TABB, supra  note 17, at 74-75 (“In practice the R
courts have been extremely reluctant to appoint trustees, thus giving considerable
power and control to debtor management.”).
179 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a); TABB, supra  note 17, at 61; see  EPSTEIN, supra  note 22, at R
131.
180 11 U.S.C. § 1101(1) (“‘[D]ebtor in possession’ means debtor except when a
person that has qualified under section 322 of this title is serving as trustee in the
case[.]”).
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ner as the bankruptcy trustee.  The debtor in possession, how-
ever, is not a creature of federal law like the bankruptcy
trustee.181  For example, the debtor is not given the right to sue
and be sued by the Bankruptcy Code.  The debtor in possession
already possesses that capacity.  One could argue that, where the
debtor’s right to sue is created by federal law, the case “arises
under” federal law and this is certainly right.  But if the debtor is
pursuing a cause of action created by the Bankruptcy Code, the
case will “arise under” Title 11 because the cause of action will
have been created by the Bankruptcy Code and there will be no
need to rely on “related to” jurisdiction.  For example, just as a
trustee may initiate a proceeding to recover a preferential trans-
fer, so, too, may the debtor in possession.182  Whether the trustee
or the debtor initiates such an action, the federal court undoubt-
edly has “arising under” jurisdiction because federal law provides
the right to recover a preferential transfer.183  Thus, one could
argue that any “related to” case in which the bankruptcy trustee
is a party “arises under” federal law because the Bankruptcy
Code bestows upon the trustee the capacity to sue and be sued.
It is not clear, however, that the same argument can apply to
“related to” cases in which the debtor in possession is a party.
Professor Ralph Brubaker has argued that any suit brought on
behalf of the bankruptcy estate, whether by the trustee or the
debtor in possession, necessarily “arises under” federal law be-
cause the bankruptcy estate is the real party in interest and is a
federally created entity.184  While this is an intuitively appealing
argument, it is not clear that the bankruptcy estate should be
viewed as a party in suits involving the trustee or debtor in pos-
session, even when the suit is intended to enlarge or shrink the
bankruptcy estate.  While the Bankruptcy Code is undoubtedly
centrally focused on the bankruptcy estate (the Code ascertains
181 See  Galligan, supra  note 9, at 34 (“[Debtor in possession] is merely a technical R
name for a debtor that continues in possession of his or her assets during the reor-
ganization.  There is no appointment involved and no change in the debtor’s
identity.”).
182 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 547(b) (creating the right for the trustee to recover a prefer-
ential transfer), 1107(a) (“[A] debtor in possession shall have all the rights, other
than the right to compensation under section 330 of this title, and powers, and shall
perform all the functions and duties, except the duties specified in sections
1106(a)(2), (3), and (4) of this title, of a trustee serving in a case under this chap-
ter.”); see also infra Part I.B.
183 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b).
184 Brubaker, supra  note 8, at 813-31. R
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the extent of the estate and then distributes the estate as appro-
priate), the Code does not appear to envision the estate as the
formal actor in all bankruptcy proceedings.  Moreover, even if a
“related to” suit is brought on behalf of the bankruptcy estate,
the suit does not raise any questions about the bankruptcy estate
and thus no reference to federal law is required.  Focusing on the
bankruptcy estate, therefore, does not bring all “related to” cases
within the federal entity line of cases.
Finally, even if one were persuaded that cases involving the
debtor in possession do “arise under” federal law, the federal en-
tity line of cases does not provide a satisfactory explanation of
the constitutional basis of “related to” cases that do not involve
the bankruptcy trustee or the debtor in possession.185  Where the
lawsuit is between third parties, none of which is a federally cre-
ated entity, there is no federal ingredient in the case.  At least
one scholar has recognized that wholly state-law claims that are
not brought by the trustee “cannot satisfy any conventional test
for arising under jurisdiction because they do not contain even
the minimal federal element present in the trustees’ suits.”186
2. The “Interpretation of Federal Law” Argument
The Supreme Court has announced that any case that requires
the interpretation or application of federal law will “arise under”
federal law within the meaning of Article III.187  Thus, federal
jurisdiction over “related to” cases can be rooted in the “arising
under” language of Article III if “related to” cases all require
reference to federal law.  This Section will refute the argument
that, even though “related to” cases largely assert state-law
causes of action that could have been asserted in the absence of
bankruptcy proceedings, the existence of a bankruptcy case in-
185 See  Cross, supra  note 9, at 1232 (ultimately rejecting the argument that all R
“related to” cases “arise under” federal law); Galligan, supra  note 9, at 34-36 (as- R
serting that the “original ingredient” theory does not satisfactorily explain situations
in which the debtor in possession brings suit); Goldberg-Ambrose, supra  note 9, at R
553 n.67.
186 Goldberg-Ambrose, supra  note 9, at 553 n.67; see also  Brubaker, supra  note 8, R
at 842-43 (acknowledging that suits between third parties are not covered by his
federal entity argument).
187 See  Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 493-94 (1983) (holding
that an action that requires a federal court to apply “substantive federal law at the
very outset” “arises under” federal law within the meaning of Article III); Osborn v.
Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 822-23 (1824) (holding that Article III
permits the exercise of federal jurisdiction in any case that depends upon the “con-
struction” of federal law).
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troduces the need for every court adjudicating a “related to” case
to interpret or apply federal law.  Specifically, this Section ex-
plores the argument that the automatic stay provision of the
Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 362, will have relevance in every
“related to” case and that all “related to” cases thus “arise
under” federal law within the meaning of Article III.  This Sec-
tion concludes that such an argument is ultimately unpersuasive.
When a bankruptcy petition is filed in federal court, the Bank-
ruptcy Code provides that any action against the debtor, as well
as any action against the property of the bankruptcy estate, is
automatically stayed.188  The property of the bankruptcy estate
includes “all of the debtor’s interests, legal and equitable, in
property wherever located and by whomever held.”189  The court
that is adjudicating the action against the debtor or the property
of the estate can determine the applicability of the automatic stay
only with reference to federal bankruptcy law.
A further examination of Osborn  reveals the significance of
the automatic stay to the jurisdictional inquiry of this Article.
The Court in Osborn  established not only that cases involving
federally created entities “arise under” federal law, but more
broadly that any case “arises under” federal law if the court adju-
dicating the case must necessarily consider the applicability of
federal law.190  The Court in Osborn  concluded that the presence
of the Bank, a federally chartered corporation, as a party in a
lawsuit would confer federal jurisdiction because in any such suit,
the court would be required to consult the Bank’s charter, a fed-
eral statute, in order to confirm that the Bank possessed the req-
uisite faculty to engage in the conduct at issue in the case.191  In
any case involving the Bank, the court would have to satisfy itself
that the Bank had the capacity to sue or be sued, which would
depend on federal law.192 The court would also have to satisfy
itself of the Bank’s capacity to make a contract, or perhaps to
own property or assert a particular kind of injury, and these
188 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1)-(2); 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra  note 3, R
§ 1.03[2][b][iii] (“The automatic stay bars anyone from taking action to recover a
debt then owing by the debtor or acting to affect property of the debtor or the estate
or in the possession of the estate.”).
189 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra  note 3, § 1.03[2][c][i]; see  11 U.S.C. § 541 R
(defining property of the estate).
190 Osborn , 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 822.
191 Id.  at 823.
192 Id.  at 823-24.
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questions also all depend on federal law.193  The Court declared
the general principle that in any case involving the application or
interpretation of federal law, the “arising under” clause of Arti-
cle III authorizes federal jurisdiction.194
The Court applied that principle again in Verlinden B.V. v.
Central Bank of Nigeria .195  Verlinden, a Dutch corporation,
sued the country of Nigeria in federal district court in New York,
but alleged state-law causes of action.196  The Supreme Court
recognized that the diversity clause of Article III did not author-
ize federal jurisdiction over a suit brought by a foreign plaintiff
against a foreign nation.197  However, the Court held that federal
jurisdiction was authorized by the “arising under” clause of Arti-
cle III because the suit required the district court to interpret and
apply a federal statute, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(FSIA), before it could proceed to adjudicate the state-law
causes of action against Nigeria.198
The FSIA expresses the general principle that foreign nations
enjoy sovereign immunity from suit in the United States.199  The
FSIA further provides, however, that a country may be sued in
either state or federal court in the United States if one of several
exceptions to immunity applies, such as an explicit or implicit
waiver of immunity.200 Thus, any court adjudicating a case
against a foreign nation is required to consult the FSIA to deter-
mine whether one of the enumerated exceptions to sovereign im-
munity applies, such that the suit is not barred by sovereign
immunity.201  As a result, because every suit against a foreign na-
193 Id.  at 824.
194 Id.  at 822 (“If it be a sufficient foundation for jurisdiction, that the title or right
set up by the party, may be defeated by one construction of the constitution or law
of the United States, and sustained by the opposite construction, provided the facts
necessary to support the action be made out, then all the other questions must be
decided as incidental to this, which gives that jurisdiction.”).
195 Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480 (1983).
196 Id.  at 482-83.  Verlinden sued the Central Bank of Nigeria, which the Court
identified as “an instrumentality of Nigeria.” Id.  at 482.
197 Id.  at 491-92.
198 Id.  at 493-94.
199 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 §4, 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (“Subject to
existing international agreements to which the United States is a party at the time of
enactment of this Act a foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the
courts of the United States and of the States except as provided in sections 1605 to
1607 of this chapter.”); Verlinden , 461 U.S. at 488.
200 See  28 U.S.C. §§ 1604-1605, 1607 (providing that foreign states have sovereign
immunity but are subject to certain exceptions); see also Verlinden , 461 U.S. at 488.
201 Verlinden , 461 U.S. at 493-94.  The Court in Verlinden  focused on the fact that
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tion “necessarily raises questions of substantive federal law at the
very outset,” the Court concluded that the exercise of federal ju-
risdiction over such suits was authorized by the “arising under”
language in Article III.202
Osborn  and Verlinden  demonstrate that any “related to” case
that requires the court to consult federal bankruptcy law will
“arise under” federal law.  In a case in which the court must de-
termine whether the automatic stay applies, the court will make
its decision with reference to the federal Bankruptcy Code and to
the decisions interpreting the automatic stay provision.  Under
Verlinden,  such a case “arises under” federal law within the
meaning of Article III.  In sum, any “related to” case brought
against the debtor or against the property of the debtor “arises
under” federal law because the court that is adjudicating the “re-
lated to” case must apply the federal law governing the auto-
matic stay provision.
However, this argument does not bring “related to” cases that
are not against the debtor or property of the estate within the
“arising under” language of Article III.203  The automatic stay
does not apply to “related to” cases in which the debtor is a
plaintiff.  These “related to” cases, therefore, do not require the
interpretation or application of federal law and cannot be said to
“arise under” federal law on that basis.  The automatic stay also
does not apply on its face to proceedings against persons other
than the debtor even though these third parties “are in some way
connected with the [debtor], such as joint tortfeasors, insurers,
sureties, co-obligor[s], guarantors, officers of the debtor, and re-
lated companies.”204
a federal court’s subject matter jurisdiction turned on whether one of the exceptions
to immunity applied. Id.
202 Id. at 493-94 (“At the threshold of every action in a district court against a
foreign state, therefore, the court must satisfy itself that one of the exceptions ap-
plies—and in doing so it must apply the detailed federal law standards set forth in
the Act.  Accordingly, an action against a foreign sovereign arises under federal law,
for purposes of Art. III jurisdiction.”).
203 Cases against the debtor or against the property of the debtor are unlikely to
be “related to” cases.  Rather, they are likely to be “arising under” or “arising in”
cases.  If the case against the debtor or the debtor’s property is based on liability
incurred before the debtor filed for bankruptcy, then the plaintiff is a creditor, who
must file a proof of claim in the bankruptcy and submit to the bankruptcy court’s
resolution of the proof of claim.  If the case against the debtor or the debtor’s prop-
erty is based on post-petition conduct, then the case will assert causes of action cre-
ated by the Bankruptcy Code.
204 Glinka v. Dartmouth Banking Co. (In re  Kelton Motors, Inc.), 121 B.R. 166,
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Some courts, however, have applied the automatic stay in cases
in which the debtor is not a party.205  Courts have held that,
where a third party is a guarantor of the debtor, the automatic
stay provision should apply to suits against the third party.206
These courts reason that a judgment against the guarantor can
bind the debtor.207  Courts have also held that a suit between
third parties may nonetheless be a suit against the property of
the debtor, such that the automatic stay should apply.208  This
position is of course consistent with the language of the statute,
which provides that an automatic stay does in fact apply to any
suit against the property of the estate.209  The courts that have
used this reasoning to impose the automatic stay upon suits be-
tween third parties, however, have construed the term “property
of the estate” so broadly as to call into question the limit of the
automatic stay.  In A.H. Robins , the Fourth Circuit stated that,
since a products liability insurance policy is property of the es-
tate, “actions ‘related to’ the bankruptcy proceedings against the
insurer or against officers or employees of the debtor who may
be entitled to indemnification under such policy or who qualify
as additional insureds under the policy are to be stayed under
section 362(a)(3).”210  Perhaps the courts that have extended the
automatic stay to suits between third parties make it possible to
argue that, because a party in any  “related to” case can attempt
192-93 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1990) (citing cases); G.H. Ishii-Chang, Litigation and Bank-
ruptcy:  The Dilemma of the Codefendant Stay , 63 AM. BANKR. L.J. 257, 257 (1989);
see  Lori J. Forlano, Note, Why Bankruptcy “Related To” Jurisdiction Should Not
Reach Mass Tort Nondebtor Codefendants , 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1627, 1627 & n.4
(1998).
205 See, e.g. , A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994, 999-1001 (4th Cir. 1986)
(explaining that the automatic stay should apply “when there is such identity be-
tween the debtor and the third-party defendant that the debtor may be said to be the
real party defendant and that a judgment against the third-party defendant will in
effect be a judgment or finding against the debtor”); Glinka , 121 B.R. at 193-94
(“Recent cases, however, show that Courts have been willing to extend § 362 to
include certain types of actions by or against non-debtors when such actions have a
significant impact on the bankrupt, its ability to reorganize, or involves property of
the estate.”); Seybolt v. Bio-Energy of Lincoln, Inc., 38 B.R. 123, 127-28 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1984) (staying an action against the sole general partner of debtor, a limited
partnership, and staying an action against individual guarantors of the debtor); Ishii-
Chang, supra  note 204, at 257; Forlano, supra  note 204, at 1627 n.4. R
206 E.g. , Seybolt , 38 B.R. at 127-28.
207 E.g. , A.H. Robins , 788 F.2d at 999-1001 (discussing cases); Seybolt , 38 B.R. at
128 (staying an action against a guarantor).
208 A.H. Robins , 788 F.2d at 1001-02.
209 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(2)-(5) (2000).
210 A.H. Robins, 788 F.2d at 1001-02.
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to invoke the automatic stay, all  “related to” bankruptcy cases
involve the interpretation or application of the automatic stay
provision and thus all  “related to” cases “arise under” federal
law.
As the Court noted in Verlinden , the mere possibility that fed-
eral law will apply might be sufficient to bring a case within the
scope of Osborn : “It has been observed that, taken at its
broadest, Osborn  might be read as permitting assertion of origi-
nal federal jurisdiction on the remotest possibility of presentation
of a federal question.”211  As such, one might argue that a “re-
lated to” case “arises under” federal law any time there is a pos-
sibility  that the automatic stay provision applies.  If the case is
one that is “related to” a bankruptcy, it “could conceivably have
[an] effect on” the bankruptcy estate.212  If the case could con-
ceivably have an effect on the bankruptcy estate, perhaps a color-
able argument could be made that the suit is essentially against
the property of the estate, such that the automatic stay should
apply.  If a colorable argument for application of the automatic
stay can be made in any  “related to” bankruptcy case, then, so
the argument goes, it is possible that all  “related to” cases “arise
under” federal law.  In truth, such an argument lacks any real
persuasive force because it is not feasible to draw the line be-
tween a colorable argument for application of the automatic stay
and a frivolous argument for application of the automatic stay.
In sum, although some “related to” bankruptcy cases do “arise
under” federal law, some clearly do not because they do not re-
quire any interpretation or application of federal bankruptcy law.
Some “related to” cases will be subject to the automatic stay,
211 Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 492 (1983) (internal quota-
tions omitted). Although the Verlinden  court flagged the concern, it did not address
it. Id. at 493 (“We need not now resolve that issue or decide the precise boundaries
of Art. III jurisdiction, however, since the present case does not involve a mere
speculative possibility that a federal question may arise at some point in the pro-
ceeding.  Rather, a suit against a foreign state under this Act necessarily raises ques-
tions of substantive federal law at the very outset, and hence clearly ‘arises under’
federal law, as that term is used in Art. III.”); see also Textile Workers Union v.
Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 471 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (charac-
terizing Osborn  as arguably standing for the proposition that “Congress may confer
[federal jurisdiction under the ‘arising under’ clause of the Constitution] whenever
there exists in the background some federal proposition that might be challenged,
despite the remoteness of the likelihood of actual presentation of such a federal
question”).
212 Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir. 1984), abrogated in part by
Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 129 (1995).
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which means that the adjudicating court will have to consult fed-
eral law (i.e., the Bankruptcy Code).  These cases fit neatly
within the “arising under” language of Article III, Section 2.
However, some “related to” cases will not be subject to the auto-
matic stay, and only a frivolous legal argument would introduce
the federal law that governs the automatic stay.  One could take
literally the language of the opinion in Osborn  and argue that,
because it is conceivable that a party will ask the court to stay the
proceedings, the case “arises under” federal law because the
court will have to consult federal law.  This reading of Osborn
and Article III, however, would make every single case—even
one that is not “related to” a bankruptcy—”arise under” federal
law.  As a result, the argument is unpersuasive, and it remains
necessary to find an Article III justification for federal jurisdic-
tion over “related to” cases in which the automatic stay is a
nonissue and where no federally created entity is a party.
B. Supplemental Jurisdiction
Some scholars have suggested that “related to” jurisdiction
falls within the bounds of Article III because it is a species of
supplemental jurisdiction.213  This Article uses the term “supple-
mental” jurisdiction to include both ancillary and pendent juris-
diction.214  All of these terms refer to the long-recognized power
213 See  Brubaker, supra  note 8, at 835-52 (contending that “related to” cases be- R
tween third parties can be justified as an exercise of supplemental jurisdiction as
long as the disputes involving the third parties are related to a claim by or against
the bankruptcy estate); Cross, supra  note 9, at 1233-50 (arguing that “related to” R
bankruptcy jurisdiction is a species of ancillary jurisdiction); Loft, supra  note 9, at R
1118-24 (suggesting that the exercise of federal jurisdiction over “related to” cases in
which at least one party has filed a proof of claim against the debtor can be justified
as a constitutional species of supplemental jurisdiction); cf.  David P. Currie, Bank-
ruptcy Judges and the Independent Judiciary , 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 441, 443 (1983)
(briefly mentioning that the “related to” case at issue in Northern Pipeline Construc-
tion Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. , 458 U.S. 50 (1982), was “arguably . . . so related
to the bankruptcy petition as to be . . . part of a case arising under federal law”).
214 Though the distinction between ancillary and pendent jurisdiction was never
perfectly clear, ancillary jurisdiction was generally used to refer to the power of a
federal court to adjudicate claims asserted by parties other than the plaintiff and
pendent jurisdiction was generally used to refer to the assertion of claims by a plain-
tiff in its complaint. WRIGHT & KANE, supra  note 14, at 122 n.41.  The use of the R
term “supplemental” in this Article is not intended to evoke the supplemental juris-
diction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, because the statute (in subsection b) limits the
exercise of federal jurisdiction more than the Constitution requires.  Instead, the
term “supplemental jurisdiction” is intended to refer to the power of federal courts
to adjudicate “cases” and “controversies,” as those terms are used in Article III,
Section 2.
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of a federal court to hear a claim that does not fall within any of
the enumerated categories of Article III, as long as the claim
forms part of the same “case” or “controversy” as a claim that
does  explicitly fall within one of the enumerated categories.215
Scholars such as Professor John T. Cross contend that, even if
“related to” cases do not themselves “arise under” federal law,
these cases are part of the same constitutional “case” or “contro-
versy” as a bankruptcy case, which clearly arises under federal
law.216  Professor Ralph Brubaker suggests that disputes between
third parties can fall within the federal court’s supplemental ju-
risdiction as long as they are related to a claim by or against the
bankruptcy estate, because claims by or against the bankruptcy
estate involve a federal entity and hence “arise under” federal
law.  Thus, Professor Brubaker contends that the civil proceed-
ings, rather than the bankruptcy petition, should be the focus.217
However, both scholars agree that Article III authorizes federal
court adjudication of “related to” cases, even when they are be-
tween non-diverse parties and involve only state-law claims.  This
Part will briefly describe the concept of supplemental jurisdiction
and explain why it fails to sweep all “related to” cases within the
scope of Article III, Section 2.
The concept of supplemental jurisdiction can be traced to Os-
born ,218 but the Supreme Court case most commonly associated
with the doctrine is United Mine Workers v. Gibbs .  In that case,
Paul Gibbs sued the international arm of the United Mine Work-
ers in federal district court.219  His suit alleged violations of both
federal law (section 303 of the Labor Management Relations
Act) and state law (unlawful conspiracy to interfere with two
contracts).220  The Court identified as a threshold question the
issue of whether the federal court had jurisdiction over the state-
law claim.221  The Court explained that the Constitution permits
a federal court to hear an entire “case,” not merely individual
claims within a case.222  According to the Court, a case, within
215 UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966); WRIGHT & KANE, supra  note 14, at R
34, 116.
216 See  Cross, supra  note 9, at 1233-48; cf.  Loft, supra  note 9, at 1119-21 (identify- R
ing the proof of claim as the “arising under” federal question).
217 Brubaker, supra  note 8, at 848-51. R
218 See WRIGHT & KANE, supra  note 14, at 116; Cross, supra  note 9, at 1233-34. R
219 Gibbs , 383 U.S. at 720.
220 Id.
221 Id.  at 721.
222 Id.  at 725 (“But if, considered without regard to their federal or state charac-
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the meaning of Article III, Section 2, is comprised of all the
claims that “derive from a common nucleus of operative fact,”
such that a plaintiff “would ordinarily be expected to try them all
in one judicial proceeding.”223  If a case has one claim that
“arises under” the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States, the federal court may also adjudicate claims that do not
“arise under” federal law, as long as those claims form part of the
same case as at least one claim that does “arise under” federal
law.224
The Court’s reasoning in Gibbs  can be employed to justify the
exercise of federal jurisdiction over all “related to” cases, but it is
necessary to accept the proposition that there is no meaningful
distinction between one federal court’s adjudication of two (or
more) claims asserted in the same lawsuit and two (or more) fed-
eral courts’ adjudication of two (or more) claims asserted in two
(or more) separate lawsuits.  That is, application of Gibbs  to the
“related to” bankruptcy context requires the following steps:
first, a bankruptcy petition is a case “arising under” federal
law.225  Second, a “related to” case based on the same set of facts
that gave rise to the bankruptcy petition is part of the same Arti-
cle III case as the bankruptcy petition itself.  Third, a federal
court, even one that is not actually adjudicating the bankruptcy
petition, can hear a case that is “related to” the bankruptcy peti-
tion.  An example illustrates the argument: suppose that a person
purchased stock in a corporation and the corporation soon there-
after files for bankruptcy protection.  The value of the stock de-
creases dramatically, so the injured person sues his or her broker
in a court other than the court where the corporation filed its
bankruptcy petition.  The injured person’s suit against the broker
is based on the bankruptcy petition itself, so the suit and the
bankruptcy petition derive from a common nucleus of operative
ter, a plaintiff’s claims are such that he would ordinarily be expected to try them all
in one judicial proceeding, then, assuming substantiality of the federal issues, there is
power  in federal courts to hear the whole.”).
223 Id.
224 Id.  (“[J]udicial power  . . . exists whenever there is a claim ‘arising under [the]
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority,’ and the relationship between that claim and the state
claim permits the conclusion that the entire action before the court comprises but
one constitutional ‘case.’” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
225 This step is clearly right.  Federal law creates the entire scheme of bankruptcy
relief, so the petition, which seeks that special form of relief, requires the application
of federal law.
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facts and hence are considered part of the same Article III case.
As a result, a federal court may adjudicate the injured person’s
suit against the broker, even if the suit asserts only state-law
causes of action and the two parties are citizens of the same
state.226
The same logic could apply to a “related to” case that derives
from a common nucleus of operative facts as a proceeding “aris-
ing under” or “arising in” a bankruptcy case.  For example, if an
injured person files a proof of claim that alleges that the debtor is
liable in tort to the injured person, the person’s suit against the
debtor’s co-tortfeasor will also be subject to federal jurisdiction
because the suit between the injured person and non-debtor
tortfeasor derives from the same facts that gave rise to the in-
jured person’s claim against the debtor.227  Alternatively, if the
injured person has not filed a proof of claim against the debtor,
but the co-tortfeasor has filed a proof of claim based on contribu-
tion or indemnification, the injured person’s suit against the co-
tortfeasor appears to derive from the same nucleus of operative
facts as the proof of claim.228
One problem with applying the logic of Gibbs  to all “related
226 Supporters of supplemental jurisdiction as an explanatory theory might object
that this hypothetical would not qualify as a “related to” case under the Pacor  test
because the suit between the injured person and the broker will not have an effect
on the administration of the bankruptcy estate.  The addition of some facts that
could give rise to a possible right of contribution would address such a concern,
however.  The broker may well find a way to label the debtor a co-tortfeasor.
227 This is a paradigmatic “related to” case because the argument can successfully
be made under the Pacor  test that the co-tortfeasor might seek contribution from
the debtor, which will affect the size of the estate.  Alternatively, if the co-tortfeasor
wins the suit, one could argue that the debtor might be able to invoke offensive
collateral estoppel to preclude the injured party from pursuing the claim against the
debtor.
228 Loft describes the WorldCom situation as a real-life example of this hypotheti-
cal.  According to Loft, the “related to” case against former officers, directors, un-
derwriters, and accountants derived from the same nucleus of operative facts as the
defendants’ indemnity and contribution claims against the debtor because the plain-
tiffs would not have sued WorldCom had its agents not acted fraudulently and the
defendants in the “related to” suit would not have filed claims against WorldCom
for indemnity and contribution had the plaintiffs not sued them.  Thus, concludes
Loft, “the factual basis—the securities fraud—in effect gave rise to the claims both
of the third-party plaintiff against the defendant, and the third-party defendant
against the estate.”  Loft, supra  note 9, at 1118. See also  New York City Employees’ R
Ret. Sys. v. Ebbers (In re  WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig.), 293 B.R. 308, 321 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) (“Here, but for WorldCom’s bankruptcy, it would have been named as a de-
fendant in the . . . action, and despite its absence as a party, its conduct will remain at
the heart of the . . . litigation.”).
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to” cases is that some “related to” cases do not  derive from the
same nucleus of operative facts as the bankruptcy petition or any
“arising under” or “arising in” proceeding.  Instead, many “re-
lated to” cases arise out of events that are separate and distinct
from the events that led to the filing of the bankruptcy petition
and are also separate and distinct from the events that led to the
filing of the proceedings “arising under” and “arising in” the
bankruptcy case.  Scholars have already recognized that
“[g]enerally, the facts that give rise to the state-law claims in
bankruptcy will not overlap to any significant extent with [the
debtor’s] petition for relief.”229
Professor Cross has conceded that “related to” jurisdiction
cannot be sustained under the theory of supplemental jurisdic-
tion that was articulated by the Court in Gibbs .230  He suggests,
however, that when the “common nucleus of operative fact”
standard is rejected in favor of a “logical relationship” standard,
“related to” jurisdiction can be understood as a species of supple-
mental jurisdiction.231  Professor Cross contends that a constitu-
tional “case” is comprised of all claims that bear a “logical
relationship” to one another.232  In particular, he suggests that
federal courts should have jurisdiction over all cases where “the
state claims are logically related to the federal cause of action
and [where] this relationship is strong enough to warrant
presenting the claims before a court at the same time.”233  In “re-
lated to” bankruptcy cases, “[t]he logical relationship . . . is the
interdependence of the federal and state claims.”234  Professor
Cross asserts that “resolving the state claims is a condition prece-
dent to the grant of a bankruptcy remedy.  A federal court can-
229 Cross, supra  note 9, at 1236; see also Galligan, supra  note 9, at 37. R
230 As Professor Cross explained:
Bankruptcy jurisdiction fails the Gibbs  factual overlap test.  A bankruptcy
court often adjudicates claims that occurred months, or even years, apart.
The underlying events giving rise to these claims may be totally unrelated.
Indeed, it is not even necessary that the parties to the claims be the same.
The only thread that ties these claims together is that all may affect the
debtor’s estate.  Outside of bankruptcy, however, this thread would hardly
be strong enough to support ancillary jurisdiction.  Therefore, critics of an-
cillary jurisdiction have correctly concluded that bankruptcy jurisdiction
fails the test established by the Court in Gibbs .
Cross, supra  note 9, at 1240-41. R
231 Id. at 1243-48.
232 Id.  at 1243.
233 Id. (footnote omitted).
234 Id.
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not decide how much property to distribute to creditors without
first wrapping up all of the state-law litigation affecting the
debtor’s rights and obligations.”235  As a result, “the scope of
bankruptcy relief is intimately tied to the outcome of the state-
law claims.”236  In this way, the state-law claims form part of the
same Article III “case.”  Moreover, allowing a federal court to
adjudicate both the bankruptcy petition and all “related to” cases
“will expedite the process of administering that estate.”237
Even if the logical relationship test were an appropriate way to
determine whether claims form part of the same Article III
“case,” Professor Cross’s theory fails to convincingly locate an
Article III basis for all “related to” cases.  “Related to” cases in
which the debtor is the plaintiff fit nicely within Professor Cross’s
theory because the debtor’s causes of action are all property of
the estate, and it is necessary to know the size of the estate
before allocating it among various creditors.  Causes of action
owned by the debtor might increase the size of the estate because
any damages awarded to the debtor will be property of the estate
and will hence be available to distribute to creditors.  The out-
comes of lawsuits between third parties, however, which are not
directly binding on the estate, are not necessary prerequisites for
administration of the estate.  The bankruptcy court can distribute
the assets and grant or deny a discharge even before the lawsuit
between third parties is resolved and even when the losing party
of the lawsuit might pursue a right of indemnification or contri-
bution against the debtor.  Even if one of the parties has filed a
proof of claim against the debtor, it is not absolutely necessary to
complete the suit prior to administration of the estate.  The claim
can be treated as contingent and estimated appropriately.  Thus,
the interdependence on which Professor Cross appears to rely
does not truly exist.
There is another problem with locating “related to” jurisdic-
tion within Article III’s grant of supplemental jurisdiction.
Whether one employs a common nucleus of operative fact defini-
tion or a logical relationship definition of “case,” the use of sup-
plemental jurisdiction to locate an Article III basis for all
“related to” cases requires one to accept that two separate suits,
pending in two different courts, can be part of the same constitu-
235 Id. at 1242.
236 Id. at 1243.
237 Id.  at 1244.
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tional case.  Such an interpretation is contrary to the word’s ordi-
nary meaning and is troubling.  It is too much of a stretch to
imagine that a dispute that derives from the same (or similar)
fact pattern as a bankruptcy petition, or a civil proceeding that
arises under title 11 or arises in the bankruptcy case and that is
adjudicated in a different federal court than the one where the
bankruptcy petition and associated civil proceedings are pending,
is part of the same “case” as the bankruptcy proceedings.  As a
result, supplemental (pendent or ancillary) jurisdiction fails to
provide a satisfactory constitutional basis for all instances of “re-
lated to” bankruptcy jurisdiction.
C. Protective Jurisdiction
Acknowledging the lack of a traditional Article III basis for all
“related to” cases, scholars and at least one Supreme Court Jus-
tice have sought to justify the constitutionality of “related to”
bankruptcy jurisdiction with a theory known as “protective juris-
diction.”238  The notion of protective jurisdiction has been ad-
vanced by many scholars and takes many forms.  At its core,
however, protective jurisdiction can be summarized as follows:
where Congress could have passed a substantive federal law, it
should be permitted to simply grant federal jurisdiction and rely
on state law to provide the rule of decision.239  Most scholars who
advocate protective jurisdiction maintain that protective jurisdic-
tion is rooted in Article III of the Constitution and is thus au-
thorized by the “arising under” clause of Article III.240
238 Galligan, supra  note 9, at 47-49 (contending that “related to” jurisdiction is a R
species of protective jurisdiction); Goldberg-Ambrose, supra  note 9, at 553 & n.67 R
(explaining that some, but not all, “related to” bankruptcy cases require a theory of
protective jurisdiction to come within the bounds of Article III); see  Nat’l Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 594 (1949) (opinion of Jackson, J.);
Alexander M. Bickel & Harry H. Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial
Process:  The Lincoln Mills Case , 71 HARV. L. REV. 1, 21, 22 n.83 (1957) (suggesting
in a short footnote that bankruptcy jurisdiction is a species of protective jurisdic-
tion); Mishkin, supra  note 9, at 189-90, 194-95 (attributing federal jurisdiction over R
state-law trustee suits against third parties to protective jurisdiction).  For a discus-
sion of Justice Jackson’s opinion in Tidewater , see infra  Part IV.B.
239 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 473-74 (1957) (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting); see  Bickel & Wellington, supra  note 238, at 19-20; Galligan,
supra  note 9, at 47-48; Herbert Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the
Judicial Code , 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 216, 224-25 (1948); cf. WRIGHT & KANE,
supra  note 14, § 20; Ray Forrester, The Jurisdiction of Federal Courts in Labor Dis-
putes , 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 114, 120 (1948); Mishkin, supra  note 9, at 192.
240 Galligan, supra  note 9, at 71-72; Goldberg-Ambrose, supra  note 9, at 587; R
Mishkin, supra  note 9, at 196. But see Tidewater , 337 U.S. at 588-601 (Justice Jack- R
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\85-1\ORE102.txt unknown Seq: 48 30-NOV-06 14:04
106 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85, 59
Professor Thomas Galligan, Jr. has carefully applied the theory
of protective jurisdiction to explain “related to” bankruptcy juris-
diction.241  Professor Galligan contends that Congress may con-
stitutionally confer federal jurisdiction “whenever Congress
acted pursuant to a valid [A]rticle I power and there was a ra-
tional reason to believe that Congress felt federal jurisdiction
was a ‘necessary and proper’ way to effectuate that [A]rticle I
power.”242  Professor Galligan argues that “related to” jurisdic-
tion falls squarely within his theory of protective jurisdiction be-
cause “[f]ederal jurisdiction over ‘related to’ cases is a ‘necessary
and proper’ means to effectuate the federal interest in an effi-
cient bankruptcy system.”243  Professor Galligan explains that
federal jurisdiction is important to cure “potential bias against
debtors,” i.e., “[a]ny bias that adversely affects the plaintiff’s abil-
ity to recover.”244  Professor Galligan also points out that a fed-
eral court can avoid delays that might occur in state court
adjudication of the debtor’s “related to” cases against third par-
ties.245  Any bias or delay, according to Professor Galligan,
“might hamper reorganization or lessen creditor recoveries in a
liquidation.”246  Professor Galligan’s observations about the
practical benefits associated with federal adjudication of “related
to” jurisdiction are persuasive,247 but his claim that protective ju-
risdiction is a species of “arising under” jurisdiction is less con-
vincing.  In order to understand why protective jurisdiction fails
as a theory rooted in Article III, it is necessary to examine the
scholars upon whose work Professor Galligan relies.
Professor Herbert Wechsler was an early and important propo-
nent of protective jurisdiction.248  Professor Wechsler argued that
a case should “arise under” federal law within the meaning of
Article III any time “Congress has authority to make the rule to
son articulating a theory of protective jurisdiction but rooting it in Article I);
Goldberg-Ambrose, supra  note 9, at 583 (recognizing that Justice Jackson “located R
the source of [protective jurisdiction] in [A]rticle I”); infra  Part IV.B-C (discussing
Justice Jackson’s opinion and the criticisms of it).
241 See  Galligan, supra  note 9, at 41-54. R
242 Id.  at 47-48 (footnote omitted).
243 Id.  at 48.
244 Id.  at 49.
245 Id.  at 49-50.
246 Id.  at 49.
247 See infra  Part IV.A (agreeing that “related to” bankruptcy jurisdiction may
well facilitate optimal resolution of the bankruptcy case).
248 Professor Galligan’s theory of protective jurisdiction is a “variant” of Profes-
sor Wechsler’s theory.  Galligan, supra  note 9, at 47-48.
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govern disposition of the controversy but is content instead to let
the states provide the rule so long as jurisdiction to enforce it has
been vested in a federal court.”249  In other words, Professor
Wechsler proposed that Congress could “assert its regulatory
powers” in at least two ways: (i) by creating a federal substantive
rule of decision or (ii) by granting access to the federal courts.250
This must be so, he argued, because if Congress has been granted
the authority to make substantive law, “it must be free to take
the lesser step” of granting federal jurisdiction.251
Professors Alexander Bickel and Harry Wellington subse-
quently lent support to Professor Wechsler’s broad view of pro-
tective jurisdiction by contending that Congress should be free to
grant access to federal court in any area in which it could permis-
sibly enact substantive federal law.252  In their view, such a grant
of federal jurisdiction was permitted by the “arising under” lan-
guage of Article III.253  Such an interpretation of the “arising
under” language would not render it meaningless because the
“arising under” language would “be read in conjunction with the
definition in [A]rticle I of an area of federal authority.”254  More-
over, such a view of Congress’ authority would permit Congress
to take advantage of the “genius of a federal system” because it
would permit Congress to “hand the conductor’s baton to the
federal courts rather than giving them a set of cymbals with
which to drown out all other sounds.”255  Congress could draw
upon the states’ diverse approaches to the problem, but federal
courts’ consistent applications of state law would lead to some
level of uniformity.256
The formulation of protective jurisdiction articulated by
249 Wechsler, supra  note 239, at 224-25 (explaining that where Congress can enact
substantive law, it “must be free to take the lesser step of drawing suits . . . to the
district courts without displacement of the states as sources of the operative, sub-
stantive law”); see also  Galligan, supra  note 9, at 44-45 (describing Wechsler’s the- R
ory); Goldberg-Ambrose, supra  note 9, at 586 (same). R
250 Wechsler, supra  note 239, at 224-25.
251 Id.
252 Bickel & Wellington, supra  note 238, at 19-20; see also Goldberg-Ambrose, R
supra  note 9, at 589 (describing Professors Bickel and Wellington as proposing that R
“cases should be deemed to arise under federal law whenever Congress has the
power to enact substantive rules to govern them, but chooses instead to confer juris-
diction on the federal courts and rely on state-made rules”).
253 Bickel & Wellington, supra  note 238, at 21 & n.80. R
254 Id.  at 21 n.80.
255 Id.  at 20.
256 Id. at 19-21.
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Professors Wechsler, Bickel, and Wellington has been criticized,
first, on the basis that Congress does not necessarily always have
the “lesser” power included within the grant of a “greater”
power.257  Second, it is arbitrary to label the enactment of a juris-
dictional statute as the “lesser” power and the enactment of sub-
stantive law as the “greater” power that encompasses the lesser.
Rather, the relevant “power” appears to be Congress’ power to
enact legislation.258  A specific statute cannot be defended on the
grounds that enacting a specific statute is a lesser-included power
within Congress’ broader power to enact statutes generally.  In-
stead, the validity of any given statute is measured against the
relevant constitutional authority.  For many statutes, it is suffi-
cient to consult Article I to determine whether the statute is a
valid exercise of Congress’ power.259  For statutes that purport to
confer jurisdiction on the federal courts, however, the Constitu-
tion requires reference to both Article I and Article III.  To label
the enactment of a jurisdictional statute a “lesser” power is to
beg the question of whether the jurisdictional statute is valid as
measured by the appropriate constitutional provisions.
A third criticism of Professors Wechsler, Bickel, and Welling-
ton’s argument is that their formulation of protective jurisdiction
would not survive Supreme Court scrutiny.  Their theory of pro-
tective jurisdiction would permit the exercise of federal jurisdic-
tion where the only “Law” that the case “arises under” is the
jurisdictional statute itself.  The Supreme Court has stated that
mere jurisdictional statutes are insufficient to confer federal ju-
risdiction.  The Court in Verlinden  took pains to explain that the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act was not merely a jurisdic-
tional statute.260  The Court was even more clear in Mesa v. Cali-
257 Goldberg-Ambrose, supra  note 9, at 590 (“[T]he law recognizes numerous sit- R
uations in which the greater power does not encompass the lesser.”).
258 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (conferring the legislative power upon Congress).
259 Of course, it is often necessary to refer to constitutional provisions other than
Article I (e.g., the Fourteenth Amendment) to ensure that Congress has not over-
stepped its authority.
260 As the Verlinden Court explained:
The [Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act] does not merely concern access to
the federal courts.  Rather, it governs the type of actions for which foreign
sovereigns may be held liable in a court in the United States, federal or
state.  The Act codifies the standards governing foreign sovereign immu-
nity as an aspect of substantive federal law, and applying those standards
will generally require interpretation of numerous points of federal law.  Fi-
nally, if a court determines that none of the exceptions to sovereign immu-
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fornia ,261 where it rejected the argument that a case can be
removed under the federal officer removal statute even when the
defendant is not asserting a federal defense.  The Court stated
that, in the absence of an alleged federal defense, there would be
“serious doubt” as to whether a federal court could constitution-
ally exercise jurisdiction over a state-law case against a federal
officer.262  The Court explicitly rejected the argument that a case
can “arise under” a statute that is purely jurisdictional: “Section
1442(a), in our view, is a pure jurisdictional statute, seeking to do
nothing more than grant district court jurisdiction over cases in
which a federal officer is a defendant.  Section 1442(a), therefore,
cannot independently support Art. III ‘arising under’
jurisdiction.”263
There is reason to believe that the Supreme Court was right to
conclude that a case cannot “arise under” only a jurisdictional
statute.  In such an instance, federal jurisdiction would not be
protective of any federal “Law” other than the jurisdictional stat-
ute itself.  The use of the word “Laws” in Article III suggests
that, if federal jurisdiction is indeed intended to be “protective”
(a dubious proposition), it should be protective of “Laws,” i.e.,
statutes enacted by Congress, not merely federal interests or pol-
icies.  However, Professor Wechsler’s formulation of protective
jurisdiction would permit an end run around that idea; specifi-
cally, federal courts could “protect” federal interests or policies
reflected only in one jurisdictional statute.
Professor Ray Forrester forwarded a different variant of pro-
tective jurisdiction in the very same year as Professor Wechsler.
Professor Forrester suggested that the Framers intended federal
jurisdiction to be “coextensive” with federal legislative authority,
“limited only by the extent of the delegated powers given to the
legislature.”264  The Framers, Professor Forrester explained, in-
tended “to insure that federal laws should be construed by fed-
eral judges with federal sympathies” and attempted to insure
nity applies, the plaintiff will be barred from raising his claim in any court
in the United States . . . .
Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 497 (1983) (citation omitted).
261 Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121 (1989).
262 Id.  at 137.
263 Id.  at 136.  “Rather, it is the raising of a federal question in the officer’s re-
moval petition that constitutes the federal law under which the action against the
federal officer arises for Art. III purposes.” Id.
264 Forrester, supra  note 239, at 118.
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“uniformity in the interpretation and application of federal
laws.”265  Thus, Professor Forrester concluded:
In matters where Congress has set up a broad legislative pro-
gram and policy, within one of the legislative powers dele-
gated in the Constitution, it may be argued that Congress is
acting within the constitutional intent in granting jurisdiction
to the federal courts over all litigation connected with and
forming a part of such a program [even] though the jurisdic-
tion includes cases connected with the program which would
otherwise be within the jurisdiction of the state courts only.266
Professor Paul Mishkin subsequently articulated a similar the-
ory of protective jurisdiction.  Professor Mishkin suggested that
“where there is an articulated and active federal policy regulating
a field, the ‘arising under’ clause of Article III apparently permits
the conferring of jurisdiction on the national courts of all cases in
the area—including those substantively governed by state
law.”267  The versions of protective jurisdiction forwarded by
Professors Forrester and Mishkin ensure that, if protective juris-
diction is exercised, it will be exercised only when the federal
judiciary is indeed “protecting” actual substantive legislation en-
acted by Congress.  The problem, however, is that there is no
principled limitation to protective jurisdiction as articulated by
Professors Forrester and Mishkin.  How tenuous may the connec-
tion between the jurisdictional statute and the federal program
be before the jurisdictional statute is considered invalid?  Ac-
cording to Professor Galligan, a remote connection is sufficient;
he suggests that Congress can enact a jurisdictional statute as
long as there is a “rational relationship” between the grant of
federal jurisdiction and “some valid national interest within Con-
gress’ [A]rticle I power.”268  If the “necessary and proper” test is
to be employed, it would appear that Congress could widely con-
fer federal jurisdiction over state-law claims.  However, it is not
clear that Article III can be understood as authorizing such a
265 Id.  at 119-20.
266 Id.  at 120; see also  Goldberg-Ambrose, supra  note 9, at 592 (describing Pro- R
fessor Forrester as forwarding “The Partial Occupation Theory,” which “justifies
protective jurisdiction through the arising under clause of [A]rticle III,” but “would
limit protective jurisdiction to subject areas in which Congress has already under-
taken some degree of substantive regulation”).
267 Mishkin, supra  note 9, at 192; see also  Goldberg-Ambrose, supra  note 9, at R
592 (classifying Professor Mishkin’s argument as a “variation on [Professor For-
rester’s] Partial Occupation Theory”).
268 Galligan, supra  note 9, at 47-48. R
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broad grant of jurisdiction over state-law claims.  Ultimately, the
theory of protective jurisdiction articulated by Professors For-
rester and Mishkin does not convincingly fit within the bounds of
Article III.
Thus, no theory can satisfactorily identify an Article III basis
for the entire scope of “related to” jurisdiction.  The federal en-
tity argument accounts only for those cases in which a trustee is a
party and, even there, the explanation relies on an arguably over-
broad interpretation of the term “arising under.”  Only those
cases in which the debtor is a defendant or the action is against
the property of the estate require interpretation or application of
federal law (the automatic stay provision), but these cases are
unlikely to be “related to” cases.  Perhaps all “related to” cases
derive from the same nucleus of operative facts as the bank-
ruptcy petition or a proceeding “arising under” or “arising in”
the bankruptcy case, or perhaps all “related to” cases bear a logi-
cal relationship to the bankruptcy case.  However, when the “re-
lated to” case is pending in a different court, it cannot be
considered part of the same “case” as the bankruptcy case.  Thus,
where the debtor is a plaintiff or the lawsuit is between third par-
ties, none of which has sought bankruptcy protection, and the
“related to” case has not been filed in the same court as the
bankruptcy case, there does not appear to be an Article III basis
for jurisdiction.  The next Part of this Article will show that it is
time to explore Article I as a viable source of federal jurisdiction
in general and “related to” bankruptcy jurisdiction in particular.
IV
ARTICLE I AS A POSSIBLE BASIS FOR
“RELATED TO” JURISDICTION
Despite the absence of an Article III “hook” for “related to”
jurisdiction, federal adjudication of “related to” cases may none-
theless foster more efficient administration of bankruptcy cases.
As Professor Galligan has noted, “[f]ederal jurisdiction over ‘re-
lated to’ cases is a ‘necessary and proper’ means to effectuate the
federal interest in an efficient bankruptcy system because it can
avoid potential state court bias as well as any potential delays
that may occur in state court.”269  Even though such an argument
is insufficient to cause all “related to” cases to “arise under” fed-
269 Id. at 48.
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eral law, it reveals the true motivation for “related to” jurisdic-
tion; namely, it was enacted to further the legislative bankruptcy
scheme.  As such, it is worth considering whether Article I,
rather than Article III, provides the constitutional basis for “re-
lated to” jurisdiction.  This argument has been made before, but
it was rejected, and it has become hornbook law that Article III
is the sole source of federal subject-matter jurisdiction.  In other
words, it has become widely accepted that Article III must be
taken literally to preclude federal courts from hearing cases that
fall outside its bounds.  Yet this view is puzzling in light of the
fact that, in an analogous context, courts and scholars regularly
challenge the notion that Article III must be read literally.  In the
context of Article I tribunals, a debate flourishes as to the scope
of Congress’ ability to create non-Article III courts.  While some
urge that Article III should be read literally to seriously limit
Congress’ ability to create non-Article III courts, others seek to
articulate a theory that will impose principled limits on depar-
tures from Article III.  It is the contention of this Article that a
similar debate should occur in the context of federal subject-mat-
ter jurisdiction.  Attempts to cram “related to” bankruptcy juris-
diction within Article III’s bounds distract from the more
fundamental question of whether federal courts should be per-
mitted to hear “related to” cases even when those cases do not
fall within the bounds of Article III.
A. The Motive for “Related To” Jurisdiction
As courts have recognized, federal “related to” bankruptcy ju-
risdiction facilitates optimal resolution of the bankruptcy case.270
Where the debtor is a plaintiff and is pursuing a pre-petition
cause of action, any recovery is property of the estate and thus
increases the amount of money that is available to distribute to
creditors.  As such, prompt resolution of the debtor’s action is
helpful, and any delay in the resolution of the debtor’s suit will
270 E.g. , New York City Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. Ebbers (In re  WorldCom, Inc.
Sec. Litig.), 293 B.R. 308, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“Broadly construing the federal
courts’ bankruptcy jurisdiction is essential to their ability to preserve assets and re-
organize the estate, particularly where there is a ‘complex factual scenario, involving
multiple claims, policies and insurers.’”) (quoting In re  U.S. Lines, Inc., 197 F.3d
631, 641 (2d Cir. 1999)); Wood v. Wood (In re  Wood), 825 F.2d 90, 92 (5th Cir. 1987)
(“Congress was concerned with the inefficiencies of piecemeal adjudication of mat-
ters affecting the administration of bankruptcies and intended to give federal courts
the power to adjudicate all matters having an effect on the bankruptcy.”).
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slow down the distribution of assets to the creditors.  Further,
even though it is not absolutely necessary to resolve a lawsuit
between third parties in order to resolve the bankruptcy case, it
may nonetheless be better for the suit to be resolved before the
bankruptcy estate is either liquidated or reorganized.  If one of
the parties has filed a proof of claim, e.g., for indemnification or
contribution, its distribution will ultimately depend on the out-
come of the “related to” case.  If none of the parties has filed a
proof of claim, they may find themselves unable to collect from
the debtor once the bankruptcy case has been resolved.  This is
not an optimal result from the perspective of bankruptcy law be-
cause the system seeks to compensate all possible creditors.  As
such, it is suboptimal for a slow-moving suit to thwart a potential
creditor’s recovery.  Federal adjudication of “related to” cases
can avoid such a negative outcome.
B. Article I as a Possible Basis for “Related To” Jurisdiction
Congress can make “all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into execution”271 the enumerated powers in
Article I, including the power to “establish . . . uniform Laws on
the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.”272
As a result, perhaps Congress can  authorize the exercise of “re-
lated to” bankruptcy jurisdiction over cases that do not “arise
under” federal law as that term has traditionally been under-
stood.  In other words, because it can plausibly be argued that
federal jurisdiction over “related to” cases is necessary in order
for Congress to create an effective federal bankruptcy system,
perhaps Congress can  enact jurisdictional statutes, such as 28
U.S.C. § 1334(b), that confer federal subject-matter jurisdiction
over cases that do not involve a federally created entity, require
any interpretation or application of federal law, or form part of
the same “case” as a claim that “arises under” federal law.
This argument, that federal jurisdiction over “related to” cases
is constitutional because it is necessary and proper to administer
the federal bankruptcy regime, should sound familiar.  It is
nearly identical to the argument made by proponents of protec-
271 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (the “necessary and proper” clause).
272 Id. § 8, cl. 4 (“[The Congress shall have Power to] establish an uniform Rule of
Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the
United States[.]”).
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tive jurisdiction.273  Indeed, the argument was articulated long
ago by Justice Jackson in National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tide-
water Transfer Co.274  Justice Jackson’s argument, however, is
different from the argument advanced by protective jurisdiction
advocates in its identification of the constitutional provision that
permits “related to” bankruptcy jurisdiction: it is Article I, not
Article III.
In Tidewater , the Court considered whether Congress could
amend the diversity statute to include controversies between citi-
zens of the states and citizens of the District of Columbia.  In
Tidewater , a citizen of the District of Columbia (a corporation)
sued a citizen of Virginia (also a corporation).275  Congress had
amended the diversity statute to permit suits between citizens of
the District of Columbia and other states.276  The Supreme Court
had previously ruled in Hepburn v. Ellzey277  that citizens of the
District of Columbia were not citizens of a “State” within the
meaning of the Judiciary Act of 1789.278  The Court arrived at
that result, however, by concluding that the District of Columbia
was not a “State” for the purposes of Article III.279  Thus, Tide-
water  squarely presented the question of whether Article III per-
mitted Congress to confer federal jurisdiction on suits between
citizens of the states and citizens of the District of Columbia.
Justice Jackson, joined by Justices Black and Burton, consid-
ered themselves bound by the reasoning of Hepburn  and held
273 See  Galligan, supra  note 9, at 47-48, 71-72 (applying protective jurisdiction to R
“related to” jurisdiction); supra  Part III.C (discussing theories of protective
jurisdiction).
274 Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949).  Goldberg-
Ambrose describes Justice Jackson’s version of protective jurisdiction as “the Effec-
tuation Theory”:
The Effectuation Theory views federal jurisdiction over appropriate state
law claims as a necessary and proper means of furthering the objects of
federal legislative power identified in Article I.  Under this theory, if Con-
gress has a proper legislative interest in a subject, then it is constitutional
for Congress to effectuate that interest solely by providing a federal forum
for adjudication of claims affecting that interest.
Goldberg-Ambrose, supra  note 9, at 583. R
275 Tidewater , 337 U.S. at 583.
276 Id.  at 584-85.
277 Hepburn v. Ellzey, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 445 (1805).
278 Tidewater , 337 U.S. at 584 (citing Hepburn); Hepburn , 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at
452.
279 Hepburn , 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 452 (concluding that the term “state” in the
Constitution included only “members of the American confederacy” and not the
District of Columbia).
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that the District of Columbia was not a state within the meaning
of Article III.280  They concluded, therefore, that cases between
citizens of the District of Columbia and citizens of the states of
the United States “were not included in the catalogue of contro-
versies over which the Congress could give jurisdiction to the
federal courts by virtue of Art. III.”281
Despite this conclusion, Justices Jackson, Black, and Burton
held that Congress was  empowered to confer federal jurisdiction
over cases between citizens of states and citizens of the District
of Columbia.282  They pointed to Congress’ Article I power to
legislate for the District and explained that Congress’ “exclusive
responsibility . . . for the welfare of the District” included “both
[the] power and duty to provide its inhabitants and citizens with
courts adequate to adjudge not only controversies among them-
selves but also their claims against, as well as suits brought by,
citizens of the various states.”283  This power permitted Congress
to create courts for the District, to confer upon them “not only
. . . the jurisdiction and powers of the federal courts in the several
states but [also] such authority as a state may confer on her
courts,”284 and also to confer on other federal courts jurisdiction
over cases involving District citizens.285  Justice Jackson’s opinion
rejected the “objection” that Article III courts cannot exercise
subject matter jurisdiction over cases that fall outside the bounds
of Article III.286
Justice Jackson drew upon bankruptcy law to support his con-
clusion.  He asserted that it was “obvious” that Article I, not Ar-
ticle III, “is the source of our system of reorganizations and
bankruptcy.”287  He pointed out that district courts were empow-
ered to hear cases between trustees and third parties that, “but
for the bankruptcy powers, would be beyond their jurisdiction
280 Tidewater , 337 U.S. at 586-88.
281 Id.  at 588.
282 Id.  at 600 (“We conclude that where Congress in the exercise of its powers
under Art. I finds it necessary to provide those on whom its power is exerted with
access to some kind of court or tribunal for determination of controversies that are
within the traditional concept of the justiciable, it may open the regular federal
courts to them regardless of lack of diversity of citizenship.”).
283 Id.  at 590.
284 Id .
285 Id.  at 590-91.
286 Id.
287 Id. at 594.
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because of lack of diversity required under Art. III.”288  Even
though the present scope of “related to” bankruptcy jurisdiction
did not exist when Tidewater  was decided, there can be no doubt
that Justice Jackson would support Article I as the basis for “re-
lated to” jurisdiction: “Under Art. I the Congress has given the
district courts not only jurisdiction over cases arising under the
bankruptcy law but also judicial power over nondiversity cases
which do not arise under that or any other federal law.”289
Justice Jackson’s argument lines up with Professor Galligan’s
justification of “related to” jurisdiction: Professor Galligan con-
tends that federal jurisdiction should be proper “whenever Con-
gress acted pursuant to a valid [A]rticle I power and there was a
rational reason to believe that Congress felt federal jurisdiction
was a ‘necessary and proper’ way to effectuate that [A]rticle I
power.”290  The critical difference between Justice Jackson’s ar-
gument and that of most protective jurisdiction scholars, includ-
ing Professor Galligan, is that Justice Jackson did not attempt to
fit his theory within the bounds of Article III; rather, he asserted
that Congress, as long as it was acting within its Article I powers,
could grant federal jurisdiction over cases that are not enumer-
ated in Article III.291
C. The “Unbreakable Rule”: Article III Courts Cannot Hear
Cases that Fall Outside the Bounds of Article III
In the very same case in which Justice Jackson articulated his
Article I theory of federal jurisdiction, six justices, in three sepa-
rate opinions, flatly rejected this argument and stated that it
would not be permissible for the federal courts to exercise juris-
diction outside the bounds of Article III.  These opinions articu-
late the argument in favor of “the unbreakable rule” and are
therefore worth exploring briefly.
The first relevant opinion was written by Justices Rutledge and
Murphy.  They dismissed the possibility that Congress can use
Article I to grant subject matter jurisdiction to a federal court
over a case that falls outside the bounds of Article III.  They did
not agree that Article III courts could “be vested, by virtue of
other provisions of the Constitution, with powers specifically de-
288 Id.
289 Id. at 599.
290 Galligan, supra  note 9, at 47-48 (footnote omitted). R
291 Tidewater , 337 U.S. at 594.
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nied them by the terms of Article III.”292  They stated, neither
“we [nor] Congress can override [Article III] limits through invo-
cation of Article I without making the Constitution a self-contra-
dicting instrument.”293  They also rejected Justice Jackson’s
description of bankruptcy jurisdiction as flowing from Article I
rather than Article III.294
Justices Rutledge and Murphy concurred in the outcome of
Tidewater , however, because they believed that the existing pre-
cedent holding that the District of Columbia was not a “state”
should be overruled.295  They contended that neither the lan-
guage nor the “historic purposes” of the diversity clause required
the District of Columbia to be excluded as a “state” within the
meaning of Article III.296  Under this view, a case between a citi-
zen of the District of Columbia and a citizen of one of the states
of the United States was a case “between citizens of different
states,” and thus not troubling at all from an Article III
perspective.297
Justices Frankfurter and Reed also rejected Justice Jackson’s
argument in their dissent from the Court’s holding.  The basis of
their dissent was that the Framers of the Constitution intended
the word “States” to mean “the political organizations that form
the Union and alone have power to amend the Constitution.”298
The Framers did not intend the word “States” to include the Dis-
trict of Columbia.299  As a result, Congress could not confer fed-
eral subject-matter jurisdiction over cases involving citizens of
the District of Columbia on Article III courts.300  Justices Frank-
furter and Reed agreed with Justices Rutledge and Murphy that
Article III represents the sole constitutional basis for federal
292 Id.  at 607 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
293 Id.  at 607.
294 Id.  at 611 (“Nor is there any merit in the view that the bankruptcy jurisdiction
of district courts does not stem from Article III. . . . [F]ederal court adjudication of
disputes arising pursuant to bankruptcy and other legislation is conventional federal-
question jurisdiction.”).
295 Id. at 618-26.
296 Id.  at 621-26.
297 Cf. id.  at 622-23 (recognizing that the Court’s holding would allow a federal
district court to entertain a suit by a citizen of the District of Columbia against a
citizen of the several states and vice versa).
298 Id.  at 653 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
299 Id.  at 653-54.
300 Id.  at 655 (“But when the Constitution defined the ultimate limits of judicial
power exercisable by courts which derive their sole authority from Article III, it is
beyond the power of Congress to extend those limits.”).
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court jurisdiction.  They focused on the principles of federalism
underlying Article III301 and pointed out that expansion of Arti-
cle III courts’ jurisdiction beyond the enumerated limits in Arti-
cle III would “disregard the distribution of powers made by the
Constitution.”302  They warned that there would be no principled
distinction between ignoring the word “States” and any of the
other words in Article III.303  They were similarly unpersuaded
that bankruptcy jurisdiction provided an example of Article III
courts exercising jurisdiction beyond the bounds of Article III.
They attributed federal jurisdiction over state-law claims for and
against the debtor to the “arising under” clause of Article III.304
Finally, Chief Justice Vinson, joined by Justice Douglas, au-
thored a dissent in which they agreed that the word “States” did
not include the District of Columbia.305  More importantly, they
agreed with a majority of their colleagues that Article III repre-
sents the sole constitutional basis for federal court jurisdiction.306
They agreed with Justice Frankfurter that treating the enumer-
ated categories as a non-exhaustive list would also justify depart-
ing from the established principle that courts may adjudicate
only “cases” and “controversies.”307  They also agreed that ex-
tending federal jurisdiction beyond the limits of Article III would
encroach on the power of the states.308
In sum, six justices disagreed with Justice Jackson’s argument
that a federal court can hear a case that does not fall within the
bounds of Article III.  At least one scholar, Professor Cross, has
already recognized that the opinions in Tidewater  present a seri-
ous obstacle to using Article I as the constitutional “hook” for
“related to” bankruptcy jurisdiction.309  Even though no majority
opinion emerged from Tidewater , it has become hornbook law
301 Id.  at 647 (“There was deep distrust of a federal judicial system, as against the
State judiciaries, in the Constitutional Convention.  This distrust was reflected in the
evolution of Article III.”).
302 Id. at 652.
303 See id.  at 648-50.
304 Id.  at 653 n.3.
305 See id.  at 626-27 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting).
306 Id.  at 628-29.
307 Id.  at 628.
308 Id.  at 628-29, 631-35.
309 See  Cross, supra  note 9, at 1211-12 (rejecting the availability of Article I as a R
valid basis of federal subject-matter jurisdiction).  Even though Professor Cross
carefully examined Tidewater  and “related to” bankruptcy jurisdiction, he ultimately
concluded that “related to” jurisdiction does  represent the exercise of Article III
jurisdiction. Id.  at 1233-48.  Nonetheless, he devoted some time to justifying the
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that Article III courts cannot exercise jurisdiction beyond the
limits imposed by Article III.310  Indeed, one scholar calls Justice
Jackson’s suggestion “close to outright jurisdictional apos-
tasy.”311  This is not surprising: Article III, Section 1 proclaims
that “[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress
may from time to time ordain and establish.”312  The very next
section describes the categories of cases and controversies to
which “[t]he judicial Power shall extend.”313  It is logical to con-
clude that the text mandates that the courts described in Section
1 of Article III should not be permitted to hear cases that are
omitted from Section 2 of the same article.
D. The “Unbreakable Rule” Has Been Broken Elsewhere
Of course, the text of Article III seems also to command that
the federal judicial power must be lodged in judges that enjoy life
tenure and a steady salary. Article III, Section 1 provides that
“[t]he judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold
their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall . . . receive . . . a
Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Con-
tinuance in Office.”314  It is possible to argue that the text of Ar-
ticle III prohibits Congress from vesting any adjudicative
authority in judges that lack these protections.315  Despite this,
position that Article III courts should not be permitted to exercise jurisdiction over
cases that fall outside the bounds of Article III. Id.  at 1211-24.
310 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3521, at 52 (2d ed. 1987) (“The traditional learning has been that
Congress has no constitutional power to vest any jurisdiction in the federal courts
that is not listed in Article III.”); WRIGHT & KANE, supra  note 14,  § 8, at 32 (citing R
Hodgson v. Bowerbank , 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303 (1809), as support for the proposition
that Article III, Section 2 is “the primary, if not the exclusive, source of power for
the federal courts”).
311 James E. Pfander, The Tidewater Problem:  Article III and Constitutional
Change , 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1925, 1926 (2004).
312 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
313 Id. § 2, cl. 1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
314 Id. § 1.
315 CHEMERINSKY, supra  note 114, § 4.1, at 217 (recognizing that it is “tempting” R
to conclude that “under the text of Article III Congress is never permitted to create
judges who lack life tenure and salary assurances” because the provisions of Article
III “seem unambiguously to require that the judicial power be vested only in courts
where the judges have life tenure and salary protection”); Pfander, supra  note 11, at R
645-46 (noting that “[t]he literal terms of Article III appear to rule out reliance upon
Article I tribunals altogether” but rejecting such a “literal application” of Article
III).
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Congress has long permitted non-Article III courts to exercise
federal judicial power.316  The Court has upheld the validity of
territorial courts,317 including courts for the District of Colum-
bia,318 courts-martial,319 courts that adjudicate “public rights,”
such as “the Court of Federal Claims, the Tax Court, and the
Court of Veterans Appeals,”320 and adjudication by administra-
tive agencies.321  As a result, while some participants in the de-
bate regarding Article I courts urge a “return to principled
Article III literalism,”322 many others explore the permissible
boundaries of non-Article III adjudication.323  By recognizing
that the existing scheme of legislative courts is inconsistent with a
literal reading of Article III, scholars have been able to engage in
an energetic and productive discussion of whether such an incon-
sistency is appropriate.  They have also been able to consider
whether there should be future departures from the literal lan-
316 CHEMERINSKY, supra  note 114, § 4.1, at 217 (“Yet, despite the apparent clarity R
of the text [of Article III], it no longer is realistic to argue that it is always unconsti-
tutional for Congress to create legislative courts to decide Article III judicial busi-
ness.  For 200 years, legislative courts have been permitted.”).
317 Am. Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 512 (1828) (holding
that a court created for the territory of Florida is constitutional); FALLON ET AL.,
supra  note 87, at 377-78.
318 Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 390 (1973) (holding that an Article I
court for the District of Columbia is constitutional).
319 Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65, 72 (1858) (holding that Article I courts
for the military are constitutional); FALLON ET AL., supra  note 87, at 378.
320 FALLON ET AL., supra  note 87, at 378-79; see  Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken
Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 285 (1856) (holding that Article I
courts for “public rights” matters are constitutional).
321 E.g. , Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 841 (1986)
(allowing state-law counterclaim to be adjudicated by the Commodity Futures Trad-
ing Commission); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 569
(1985) (permitting the Environmental Protection Agency to employ a system of ne-
gotiation and binding arbitration, subject to only limited judicial review, to deter-
mine the compensation owed to corporations whose mandatorily collected data is
used in the pesticide registration process); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 47 n.11,
(1932) (citing cases in which administrative adjudication was permitted and rejecting
a challenge to the workers’ compensation scheme established by the Longshore-
men’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act).
322 Currie, supra  note 213, at 443-59 (recommending a restrictive reading of Arti- R
cle III); Pfander, supra  note 11, at 647 & n.8 (citing scholars that have argued in R
favor of taking Article III literally to preclude Article I courts); Martin H. Redish,
Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and the Northern Pipeline Decision ,
1983 DUKE L.J. 197, 201 (criticizing the Northern Pipeline  opinions’ approaches to
non-Article III courts and suggesting that Article III may prohibit all non-Article III
courts).
323 See, e.g. , Pfander, supra  note 11, at 647 (briefly outlining the debate and iden- R
tifying scholars).
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guage of Article III, and, if so, what those departures should look
like.  A similar discussion should take place in the context of Ar-
ticle III courts’ jurisdiction.  That is, the “unbreakable rule,”
which provides that Article III courts’ jurisdiction is limited by
Article III, should be reexamined.
CONCLUSION
It is the contention of this Article that, contrary to the sugges-
tion of most scholars, “related to” bankruptcy jurisdiction pro-
vides an instance in which Article III courts are  adjudicating
cases that fall outside the bounds of Article III.324  Perhaps “re-
lated to” jurisdiction should be restricted to comply with tradi-
tional Article III limits.325  On the other hand, perhaps the
exercise of federal jurisdiction over “related to” bankruptcy
cases facilitates optimal resolution of bankruptcy cases, such that
the federalism concerns that animate traditional Article III limits
are not offended by the exercise of federal jurisdiction in the “re-
lated to” bankruptcy context.326  That is, perhaps a departure
from Article III is warranted in light of the particular interests
that attend the federal bankruptcy scheme.  Confronting this nar-
row question should encourage a broader dialogue regarding
whether and when departures from Article III are warranted in
other arenas.  It is beyond the scope of this Article to provide
answers to these questions, but it is the contention of this author
that, in light of the reality of “related to” bankruptcy jurisdiction,
it is necessary to consider whether Article III truly is the exclu-
sive source of subject matter jurisdiction for Article III courts.
324 See supra  Part III (arguing that “related to” bankruptcy jurisdiction does not
fall within the bounds of Article III).
325 See supra  note 10. R
326 Cf.  Goldberg-Ambrose, supra  note 9, at 609-14 (proposing that the Tenth
Amendment be used to mitigate federalism concerns when federal courts adjudicate
state-law claims).
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